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COMMENTS 
An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ills that plague American metropolitan centers are all too 
familiar. Not least among them are the over-burdened system of fi-
nancing municipal services1 and the lack of coordination of the 
services provided by the multitude of local governments that make up 
urban areas.2 It is thus surprising that little attention has been paid 
to recent developments concerning public authorities, autonomous 
government entities created for the solution of a single problem and 
primarily financed, not through new taxes, but through private in-
vestment in revenue bonds.3 
For years state and local governments have used the authority 
device to provide revenue-generating services. Among the reasons for 
the popularity of authorities have been their ability to finance capital 
facilities without increasing taxes or violating state debt restrictions 
on local governments and the belief that they operate more efficiently 
I. Bond issues and school levies have been defeated with increasing frequency 
across the nation as part of a so-called "taxpayers' revolt." It has been estimated that 
up to one half of all bond issues proposed in the November 1970 congressional elec• 
tions were defeated. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Nov. 16, 1970, at 60. See also Bradford, 
Malt & Oates, The Rising Cost of Local Public Services: Some Evidence and Reflections, 
22 NATL. TAX J. 185 (1969); Wall St. J., May 11, 1970, at I, col. I. Nationwide 
attention has also been focused on demands for property tax reform. See, e.g., Januta, 
Municipal Revenue Crisis: California Problems and Possibilities, 56 CALIF, L. REv. 
1525 (1968); Stickney, Coming of Age in America: The Need for Property Tax Reform, 
21 AD. L. R.Ev. 325 (1969); Tideman, Fractional Assessments-Do Our Courts Sanction 
Inequality?, 16 HAsTINcs L.J. 573 (1965). See generally D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF TH£ 
PROPERTY TAX (1966); Gaffney, What is Property Tax Reform?, 31 AM. J. EcoN. 8c 
SOCIOL. 139 (1972). And revenue sharing plans have been suggested to alleviate the 
cities' financial plight. See, e.g., State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. II 1973)); S. Rep. 
No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See generally W. HmscH, P. VINCENT, H. 
TERRELL, D. SHOUP & A. RosEIT, FISCAL PRESSURES ON THE CENTRAL CITY (1971); Colman, 
Revenue Sharing: Problems and Prospects, 1 URBAN LAw. 34 (1969); The Controversy 
Over Revenue Sharing, 50 CONG. DIG. 99 (1971). 
2. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES TO GoVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAs 8-10 (1962) 
(fragmentation of governmental units, failure to achieve coordination and economies of 
scale); U.S. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTER GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: 
CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 36-37 (1961) (failure to achieve economies of scale, frag-
mentation of governmental units in provision of utilities) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN 
AMERICA]. 
3. The most complete general discussion of the recent growth of urban multi• 
county authorities is in R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN URBAN AREAs (1969) [hereinafter 
URBAN Aru!As]. For other recent works providing background information about 
authorities, see R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND LoCAL GOVERN-
MENT (1964) [hereinafter PUBLIC AUTHORITIES]; Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional 
History of Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CoRNELL L. R.Ev. 521 (1971); 
Symposium on Public Authorities, 26 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 589 (1961). 
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than other governmental bodies because of their corporate structure 
and powers. In recent years, however, the jurisdictional flexibility of 
authorities, which allows them to be superimposed upon a given area 
without regard to existing city and county boundaries, has become 
increasingly important in decisions to create them. As a result, a new 
wave of powerful multicounty authorities has been generated 
throughout the country, as evidenced by such bodies as the New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 4 the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, 5 the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Tran-
_sit District,6 and the New York State Environmental Facilities Cor-
poration.7 
This Comment will briefly define and describe authorities in gen-
eral, 8 as well as the new multicounty authorities. Their legal status 
and practical advantages and disadvantages will be explored. Finally, 
an attempt will be made to isolate the uses to which multicounty 
authorities can most profitably be put in light of the conflicting goals 
of maximum governmental efficiency and public accountability. 
II. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: BACKGROUND 
A. Definition and Description 
Authorities are one of several types of governmental units that, 
unlike more traditional governmental bodies, are assigned a single 
responsibility. Single-purpose units can be divided into two catego-
ries: (I) agencies, bureaus, boards, and commissions, which are merely 
branches of such general-purpose governments as cities, counties, and 
states; and (2) special governments, which include special districts 
and public authorities. Special governments are characterized by 
corporate organization, financial and operational independence, and 
jurisdictional flexibility. Within this category, different methods of 
financing distinguish public authorities from special districts.9 Spe-
4. See N.Y. Pun. AUTH, LAw §§ 1260-78 (McKinney 1970), as amended, N.Y. PUB. 
AUTH. LAw §§ 1263-76-a (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
5. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, §§ 1-29 (1970). 
6. See CAL. Pun. UTIL. CoDE §§ 28500-9757 (West 1965), as amended, CAL. Pun. UTIL. 
CoDE §§ 28700-959 (West Supp. 1973). 
7. See N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw §§ 1280-98 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
8. Authorities remain perhaps the least known and understood of all governmental 
units. One commentator characterized "special districts"-defined in a way that 
includes many of the authorities with which this Comment is concerned-as "the 
'new dark continent of American politics,' a phrase applied earlier in the century to 
counties." J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRicr GoVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1957). 
See also Punuc AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at ix, 4-6. 
9. See CoUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, PUBUC AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES 5-6 (1953) 
[hereinafter CoUNCIL REPORT]; URBAN AREAs, supra note 3, at 246; Edelstein, The 
Authority Plan-Tool of Modem Government, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 177, 177 n.l (1943); 
Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 591, 591 
(1961); Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 YALE 
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cial districts are backed by the taxing power of the creating state or 
local government; they are financed through current tax revenues 
or through general obligation bonds that pledge future tax revenues. 
Apart from school districts, which outnumber all the other kinds 
combined,10 the most common kinds of special districts are soil con-
servation, drainage, fire protection, housing and urban renewal, 
water supply, cemetery, and sewerage districts.11 Public authorities, 
on the other hand, operate primarily through the sale of revenue 
bonds that are not backed by taxes.12 A typical authority constructs 
and operates a revenue-producing facility and pays its bondholders 
with self-generated revenue. Authorities are most frequently used in 
areas of traditional state responsibility, such as providing transporta-
tion (including port and terminal facilities, highways, bridges, tun-
nels, ferries, and transit systems), operating public buildings (includ-
ing schools, dormitories, courthouses, and administrative offices), and 
constructing dams, airports, and hospitals. Yet, they have also been 
used to operate pollution control facilities,13 parking facilities, recre-
ational facilities, garbage disposal plants, steam heating systems, in-
dustrial exhibits, municipal theaters, war memorials, planetariums, 
and mineral springs.14 
The numerical growth of special governments is an indication of 
their increasing importance in state and municipal government. 
Their number has increased from 8,299 in 1942 to 21,264 in 1961.115 
The statistics do not distinguish between special districts and authori-
LJ. 14-, 14 &: n.l (1937); Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 553, 555 
(1957). 
10 U.S. BUREA.U OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, 
VoL. 1: GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 1 (1968) [hereinafter GOVERNMENTAL 0RGANIZA• 
TION]. 
11. Id. at 5. 
12. URBAN .AREAs, supra note 3, at 246. It must be noted that there is not universal 
agreement on this distinction. See, e.g., J. BOLLENS, supra note 8; GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATION, supra note IO, at 14 (possession of taxing power "noncritical" to defini-
tion of "special district," no distinction made between special districts and public 
authorities); U.S • .ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROBLEM 
OF SPECIAL DISI'RICTS IN .AMEruCAN GoVERNMENT 1 (1964). A vast semantic problem is 
also created by the various state systems of nomenclature, which use such terms as 
"authorities," "districts," "public corporations," "commissions," and "agencies," seem-
ingly without regard to the actual characteristics of their creations. Gerwig, supra note 
9, at 592-94. See also Novak, Legal Classification of Special District Corporate Forms in 
Colorado, 45 DENVER L.J. 347 (1968). 
13. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAW §§ 1280-98 (McKinney Supp. 1972). For a description of 
this authority, see text accompanying notes 153-64 infra. 
14. Gerwig, supra note 9, at 597. 
15. GovERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 10, at 23. The same figures show that 
"special districts,'' which by Census Bureau definition include authorities, increased 
in number 16.1 per cent between 1962 and 1967, while the next greatest percentage 
increase was only .3 per cent, for municipalities. Id. 
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ties,16 but almost half of the special-purpose units lack the power to 
levy property taxes.17 
The amount of outstanding debt of special governments is a rough 
measure of the number and size of the capital facilities that they 
finance and operate. The total debt outstanding of special govern-
ments in 1966-67 was 17 .2 billion dollars, more than twice the total 
debt of county governments and about one fifth of the total debt of all 
local governments.18 Individual special governments, however, vary 
greatly in size and importance. Ninety per cent of the special govern-
ments had outstanding debts of less than I million dollars.19 The fact 
that there are twenty-five districts and authorities with debt greater 
than 100 million dollars, including the Port of New York Authority 
with expenditures of 210 million dollars and debt of 845 million 
dollars, 20 indicates that financial power is concentrated in a few large 
units.21 These are found, as would be expected, in areas of dense pop-
ulation; although only about one third of all the special districts and 
authorities are within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,22 most 
of the large special governments, which deal with transit, housing, 
water and sewerage, and port facilities, are found in urban areas.23 
One of the most important aspects of special governments is the 
fact that their jurisdiction can be defined to fit a particular need with-
out regard to existing city or county boundaries. Thus, a water sup-
ply district or transit authority may be superimposed upon the grid 
of city limits and county lines, its shape dictated only by the dimen-
sions of the problem to be solved. This unique characteristic has not 
been taken advantage of as frequently as might be expected. The vast 
majority of special districts and authorities are located entirely within 
one county, and nearly one fourth have the same boundaries as some 
16. Id. at 14. 
17. Id. at 12. 
18. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, 
VOL. 4, No. 2: FINANCES OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS 3 (1968) [hereinafter FINANCES OF SPE· 
CIAL DISTRICTS]. About 13.2 billion dollars of the debt was unsecured and not "full 
faith and credit" debt. Id. 
19. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 10, at 5. 
20. FINANCES OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS, supra note 18, at 4. 
21. Altogether, the 25 largest (out of 21,264) special governments account for more 
than one fourth of the national totals of special-government revenue, e.xpenditure, and 
indebtedness. In addition, only 12 state governments had a larger amount of debt out-
standing than the Port of New York Authority. Id. 
22. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, defined by the U.S. Bureau of the 
Budget, generally consist of a single county or a group of contiguous counties that 
includes at least one central city of at least 50,000 inhabitants. In 1967, there were 
227 SMSAs, within which nearly two thirds of the country's population resided. GOVERN-
MENTAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 10, at 10. 
23. FINANCES OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS, supra note 18, at 3-4. 
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unit of general government. However, in 1967, there were some 2,300 
special governments extending into two or more counties.24 
B. Creation, Organization, and Termination 
Authorities usually originate in one of three ways,25 pursuant to a 
state's power to provide for the creation of local governmental en-
tities: (1) through special act of the state legislature;26 (2) through a 
general act allowing counties and municipalities, singly or together, 
to create authorities;27 or (3) through a general act enabling the elec-
torate of a defined region to approve their creation.28 Although usu-
ally less visible, authorities created by cities and counties under en-
abling acts have much the same legal structure and status as the 
larger authorities created directly by the state.29 
As with any statutorily created body, a given authority's structure 
and powers can only be understood by reference to the specific leg-
islation creating it. Nevertheless, some generalizations as to organi-
zation and management are possible. Most authorities follow a cor-
porate pattern and are governed by a board of commissioners or 
directors, who are generally not paid a salary.30 Directors are likely to 
be middle-class businessmen or professionals.81 On the whole, there 
are more elected than appointed officials directing special govern-
24. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 10, at 5-6. An authority that extends 
into two or more counties is not necessarily a "multicounty authority" as the term 
is used in this Comment. The multicounty authorities discussed herein have jurisdic• 
tion over the entire area of two or more counties. 
25. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 38-39, also mentions creation by the state 
executive pursuant to legislative authorization, a fourth method that is rarely en-
countered. 
26. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw §§ 1-3002 (McKinney 1970), as amended, N.Y. 
PUB. AUTH. LAw §§ 102-a to 2602 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
27. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 12601 (Supp. 1973): "In each county of the 
second and second A class of this Commonwealth, there is hereby created a body 
corporate and politic to be known as the 'Authority' of said county ••• provided, how-
ever, that such 'Authority' shall not become operative nor transact any business until 
and unless the board of county commissioners ••• shall ••• declare its creation, and 
appoint and designate the members thereof, as in this act herein prescribed." For 
similar authorization to cities, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 303 (1957). See also MICH. 
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 124.352 (Supp. 1973) (allowing the creation of mass transportation 
authorities by cities with populations of not more than 300,000); MICH, CoMP. LAws 
ANN. § 124.404 (Supp. 1973) (permitting one or more counties in major metropolitan 
areas to create regional transportation authorities). 
28. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.58.030 (1965), which authorizes two or 
more cities, at least one of which is a "city of the first class," to organize metropolitan 
municipal corporations following voter approval. An election may be called by a resolu-
tion of (1) the city council of a central city or the board of commissioners of a central 
county, or (2) the city councils of two or more of the noncentral component cities. Al-
ternately, an election may be called by petition of four per cent of the registered voters 
within the metropolitan area. WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 35.58.070 (1965). 
29. See Gerwig, supra note 9, at 599. 
30. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 40-44, 47; Gerwig, supra note 9, at 601. 
31. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 57-64. 
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ments,32 but the more important authorities are usually governed by 
appointed directors.33 Occasionally, directors are appointed exclu-
sively by the governor.34 In other authorities, some directors are ap-
pointed by the governor and others by local mayors.35 However, when 
a measure of localism is desired, the power to appoint or to approve 
the appointment of authority directors is often reserved to the gov-
erning bodies of the affected cities and counties.36 
An authority is given a number of corporate powers in order to 
carry out its purposes. New York authorities, for example, are almost 
invariably allowed to sue and be sued, to have a seal, to borrow 
money and issue negotiable notes and bonds, and to make bylaws 
for internal management.37 Also, the control given an authority over 
a revenue-producing project usually explicitly includes the power to 
set rates for the service.38 · 
Certain governmental powers, such as eminent domain, 39 the sub-
poena power,4° and the power to establish a police force,41 may also be 
explicitly given to an authority if necessary to the accomplishment 
of its goals. In addition to these powers specifically designated by 
statute, authorities may also possess ancillary powers, which may be 
derived from a "necessary and proper" clause in the legislation42 
32. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, 
VOL. 6, No. 1: POPULARLY ELECIED OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 4 
(1968). 
33. E.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6405 (McKinney 1961) (Port of New York Au-
thority); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1263 (McKinney 1970) (New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 6 (1970) (Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority). 
34. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 6 (1970) (Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority). Dearing, Turnpike Authorities in the United States, 26 LAw &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 741, 745 (1961), observes that in the case of turnpike authorities the appointive 
power almost always resides solely in the governor. 
35, E.g., !LI.. ANN, STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 320 (1966) (Chicago Transit Authority). 
36. E.g., CAL. PUB, UTIL. CODE §§ 28701, 28733 (West Supp. 1973) (San Francisco 
Bay Area Rapid Transit District); N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw § 1053 (McKinney 1970) (Erie 
County Water Authority). See Tobin, The Legal and Governmental Status of the 
Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIAMI L. REv. 129, 148 (1958), for examples of 
special districts with city or county officials as ex officio directors, another concession 
to localism.. 
37, See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 553, 578, 1054, 1204, 1265, 1299-e (McKinney 
1970), as amended, N.Y. AUTH, LAW §§ 1054, 1204, 1265 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
38. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 103 &: 141 infra. 
39. For examples of authorities with the power of eminent domain, see CAL. STS. 
& HWYs. CODE§ 30403 (West 1969) (California Toll Bridge Authority); CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CoDE § 29010 (West 1965) (San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District). See also 
Gerwig, supra note 9, at 601; Tobin, supra note 36, at 149. 
40. E.g., N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw § 1265(12) (McKinney 1970) (New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority); N.Y. Pun. Aurn. LAw § 1006 (McKinney 1970) (Power 
Authority of the State of New York). 
41. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:2-25 (1963) (Port of New York Authority in New Jer-
sey); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 147, § 10D (1972) (Massachusetts Turnpike Authority). 
42. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 124.406(i) (Supp. 1973) (Southeastern Michigan 
Transportation Authority); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw §§ 1054(18) (Erie County Water 
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or may be implied by a court.43 
There is little control or supervision by the parent government 
over the means by which an authority carries out its functions.44 Be-
cause they are independently financed, authorities need not submit 
appropriations requests to be examined as part of a general govern-
ment's yearly budget review. As one commentator summarizes, "In a 
very practical sense ... they are the most autonomous units of gov-
ernment in the country."45 
Authorities were originally seen as temporary entities, which were 
to fulfill a specific purpose, pay off their bondholders, turn their prop-
erty over to the state or city, and then dissolve.46 This pattern is some-
times followed in small authorities, but the virtual permanence of 
larger authorities is now taken for granted.47 Authorities are now re-
sponsible for projects whose cost and size require long-range plan-
ning, and they usually issue long-term bonds. Moreover, authorities 
in metropolitan areas are almost inevitably caught up in plans for 
additional capital construction, supplementary facilities, or improve-
ments. Since the legislation creating many authorities pledges to the 
bondholders that the state will not alter the rights of the authority to 
collect revenues until all debts and the interest thereon are paid, 48 
each new issue of bonds for expansion that extends the final maturity 
date also extends the projected date of the termination of the au-
thority.49 
Authority), 1265(14) (New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority) (McKinney 
1970). 
43. See California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal. 2d 43, 53, 251 P.2d 4, 
9 (1952) (authority has only such additional powers as are necessary for the efficient 
administration of powers expressly granted, or such as may be fairly implied). 
44. See COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 41. See also PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 
3, at 53-57. 
45. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 55. 
46. The language found in many of the New York statutes creating authorities 
expresses this idea. For example, the statute creating the Nassau County Bridge 
Authority reads: "Such board and its corporate existence shall continue only for a 
period of fifteen years, and thereafter until all its liabilities have been met and its 
bonds have been paid in full or such liabilities or bonds have othenvise been dis-
charged. Upon its ceasing to exist, all its rights and properties shall pass to the 
county of Nassau." N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 653 (McKinney 1970). See also N.Y. Pun. 
AUTH. LAw § 1402 (McKinney 1970) (Amsterdam Parking Authority). 
47. See generally URBAN .AREAs, supra note 3, at 1-48. 
48. E.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw §§ 830, 1060, 1188, 1271, 1299-k (McKinney 1970). 
49. The legislation creating the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority explicitly 
authorizes the continuation of the Authority's control over all its projects as long as 
any liabilities are outstanding, despite the fact that a particular project's bonds may 
have been paid off. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 552(2) (McKinney 1970). See also URBAN 
AREAS, supra note 3, at 22: "It now is obvious that these agencies are not going to 
disappear from the scene of local government. They are units of government that 
must be worked into the fabric of American federalism." 
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C. Tax Exemption 
Authorities, like other governmental units, enjoy tax exemption, 
which facilitates their operation in two ways. First, the interest re-
ceived by investors on authority bonds is exempt from local, state, 
and federal income tax, which presumably renders the bond issues 
attractive to investors and thus makes possible the financing of public 
services at an interest cost lower than that which a profit-making cor-
poration would have to pay. Second, authorities themselves are ex-
empt from income taxes on their operating profit and from local 
property taxes, thus avoiding the anomaly of one branch of govern-
ment taxing another branch. · 
The Internal Revenue Code provides that, generally, gross in-
come does not include interest on the obligation of a state, or of any 
political subdivision of a state.50 A political subdivision is defined in 
the regulations to include any division of a state "to which has been 
delegated the right to exercise part of the sovereign power of the 
State .... " 151 In Commissioner v. Shambergs Estate,52 a case involv-
ing the ta.xability of the interest on bonds issued by the Port of New 
York Authority, the second circuit court of appeals found that the 
Port Authority was a "political subdivision" even though it lacked 
the power to tax because its activities were carried on for a "public 
purpose": 
Here the activities, even though some of them might have been ex-
ercised by private corporations under appropriate legislation, are 
exercised for a public purpose by an agency set up by the states and 
given many public powers, though not of taxation or control through 
the suffrages of citizens. It minimizes its public and political char-
acter to treat such an agency as a private corporation merely because 
of the lack of taxing power which is only one of the attributes of 
sovereignty.153 
The same court expressed much the same view in Commissioner v. 
White's Estate,154 where it held that interest on the bonds of the Tri-
50, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 103(a}(l). 
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (1956). 
52, 144 F.2d 998 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945). The "political subdivision" 
language in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is similar to that in the 1938 Act. 
Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 103(a)(l) with Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b) 
(4)(A), 52 Stat. 458. 
53. 144 F.2d at 1005. 
54. 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,.323 U.S. 792 (1945). Accord, Woll<-
stein v. Port of New York Authority, 178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1959). See also United 
States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 190 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Wash. 1960), in 
which it was held that the Authority, as an agency of the state, was not subject to 
federal transportation taxes despite the fact that it took over a ferry system that had 
been previously operated as a private business. 
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borough Bridge Authority was not subject to income tax, notwith-
standing the fact that the bonds were the obligation of the Authority 
only and not of New York City. Since the issue has not been raised 
again, these cases appear to have settled the matter of federal income 
tax on authority bond interest. States follow the federal government 
in not taxing the income from these bonds,55 and most authority-
creating legislation now pledges to bondholders that the bonds and 
notes, the income therefrom, and the fares and revenues pledged to 
secure the bonds will be free from taxation. 56 
Since authorities are state created or authorized instrumentalities, 
they are not likely to be subjected to state and local property taxes; 
some statutes expressly exempt them.57 In Bush Terminal Co. v. City 
of New York,"•8 the plaintiffs sought to restrain the Port of New York 
Authority and the city from entering into a statutorily authorized 
contract for payments in lieu of the significantly greater regular prop-
erty taxes. 58 Despite the absence of an express provision in the statute 
exempting authorities from local property taxes, the court found the 
property immune under the general rule that property held by a state 
agency is immune from taxation when used for a public, rather than 
a pro.fit-making, purpose.60 The immunity was not lost merely be-
cause the agency incidentally derived income from the property. 
It is possible, however, that there will be increased pressure to tax 
authority property as it becomes known that authorities are increas-
ingly involved in "proprietary" enterprises that may generate substan-
tial surpluses61 and that they hold a great deal of valuable metropoli-
tan property that would be taxed if owned by a private corporation.62 
55. At least three courts have discussed whether the income of authorities and the 
interest income of their bondholders can be exempted from taxation under their 
state constitutions. Orbison v. Welch, 242 Ind. 385, 179 N.E.2d 727 (1962); Opinion of 
the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956); State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 
265 Wis. 185, 60 N.W .2d 873 (1953). 
56. E.g., CAL. PuB. Um.. CODE § 29290 (West 1965); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 95-2416, 
95-2428 (1972); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 18 (1970); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 371-72, 
536, 566, 566a, 1207g, 1275 (McKinney 1970). 
57. E.g., N.Y. PUB. Aum. LAw §§ 1243, 1299-o (McKinney 1970). 
58. 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269 (1940). 
59. Under the statute the payments in lieu of taxes were not to exceed the tax that 
was collected on the land before the Authority purchased it. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws 
§ 6971 (McKinney 1961). 
60. 282 N.Y. at 321-22, 26 N.E.2d at 276. See also Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 
721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956) (property-including that leased to commercial users-and 
income on bonds of proposed Massachusetts Port Authority tax exempt). 
61. See text accompanying notes 84-87 infra. 
62. See Gerwig, supra note 9, at 611 n.111. Some evidence that courts are occa-
sionally willing to allow taxation of property over which the authority exercises con-
trol is found in Borough of Moonachie v. Port of New York Authority, 38 N.J. 414, 
185 A.2d 207 (1962). The court there held that land acquired by the authority was tax 
exempt but that a manufacturing plant built by the Authority thereon and leased 
for revenue was subject to local taxes. See also Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Weehawken 
Twp., 45 N.J. 336, 212 A.2d 364 (1965). 
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As long as authorities carry out public purposes, there seems to be 
little point in taxing them, raising their costs, and using the revenue 
to carry out other public purposes, except perhaps in the case of an 
authority that accumulates a large surplus. In that case it might be 
argued that once the authority's duties are fulfilled, the other public 
purposes of the local governments ought to benefit from the revenues 
contributed by local citizens. Some authorities are already required 
to make payments in lieu of taxes by their creating legislation;63 the 
application of such a provision might best be triggered by the accu-
mulation of a surplus. 
D. History 
At first the history of authorities was closely tied to that of special 
districts, which were in widespread use before the authority device 
was fully developed.64 Not only were many of the judicial doctrines 
relating to special districts carried over to authorities, but also legis-
lative attitudes toward the two types of bodies tended to be similar 
because they were created for many of the same reasons. 
The most important of these reasons may have been the desire to 
avoid constitutional and statutory limitations on the amount of debt 
that a state, county, or municipality may incur.65 These limitations 
originated in the economic disasters of the nineteenth century. The 
depression of 1837-39 found a number of state governments hope-
lessly overextended in their borrowing to finance public works; in a 
period of declining revenues and high fixed costs, nine state govern-
ments were forced to default, and four of these eventually repudiated 
portions of their outstanding debt.66 In the depression of 1873-
79, it was primarily local, rather than state, governments that were 
63. E.g., N.Y. PUB. Aura. LAW § 1296 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (New York State 
Environmental Facilities Corporation). See also N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6971 (Mc-
Kinney 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-144 (1963) (Port of New York Authority, volun-
tary payments authorized). 
64. For early history of authorities and other special governments, see COUNCIL 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 9-21; Gerwig, supra note 9, at 594-99; Tilden, Forerunners of 
the Public Authority, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. l (1966). See also Quirk & Wein, supra 
note 3; Note, Constitutional Restrictions on the Use of Public Authorities in the New 
England States, 43 B.U. L. R.Ev. 122 (1963). 
65. See J. BOLLENS, supra note 8, at 7-9; PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 31; 
Makielski, The Special District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L REv. 1182, 1187 (1969); 
Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected By Constitutional Debt 
Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 177, 201-09 (1937). See generally Morris, Evading Debt 
!,imitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Con-
stitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958). See also text accompanying notes 304-15 infra. 
However, it is easy to overemphasize the role played by the desire to avoid debt 
limitations: "It is true that some special districts have been created to avoid debt 
limits, but it is also true that most of the special districts in existence today would 
probably have been created even if every state granted its local governments unlimited 
power to incur debt." L. GOODALL, STATE REGULATION OF LoCAL INDEBTEDNESS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 65 (1964). 
66. B. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 98-99, 114 (1941). 
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overextended; defaults amounted to upwards of 150 million dollars 
out of a total of 750 million dollars of outstanding debt.67 These di-
sasters, and further defaults in 1893, prompted many states to adopt 
constitutional restrictions on the types and amounts of debt that state 
and local governments could incur. 68 As a result, a large number of 
states have long had constitutional restrictions on state debt, which 
set a debt ceiling, limit bond maturities to twenty years or less, or re-
quire referendum approval of debt proposals.69 Similarly, every state 
has restricted the incurring of debt by local governments, usually in 
one or more of five ways: (1) a limit on the amount of debt; (2) a time 
limit on the maturity of bonds; (3) a maximum rate of interest; (4) 
restrictions on the purposes for which bonds may be issued; and (5) 
requirements that a referendum be held before bonds are issued.70 
Of these, the most common limit is on the amount of debt, usually 
expressed as a percentage of assessed valuation.71 
Special districts and authorities, although they may be subject to 
their own limitations,72 could finance projects without adding to the 
debt of the general governments, because they were considered to be 
entirely separate governmental units.73 Thus, whenever debt limita-
tions restricted further financing, the creation of a special govern-
ment offered a way around the law. 
67. A. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 15-17 (1936); Hill-
house, Lessons from Previous Eras of Default, in MUNICIPAL DEBT DEFAULTS: THEIR 
PREVENTION AND ADJUSTMENT IO (C. Chatters ed., Pub. Ad.min. Serv. Publication No. 
33, 1933). 
68. See generally A. HILLHOUSE, supra note 67; L. LANCASTER, STA1E SUPERVISION OF 
MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS (1923); P. STUDENSKY, PUBLIC BORROWING (1930). For a concise 
summary of the history of constitutional limitations on borrowing, see L. GOODALL, 
supra note 65, at 4-17. 
69. W. MITCHELL, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEBT LIMITS ON STA1E AND LOCAL GoVERN• 
MENT BORROWING 35-37 (1967). Mitchell finds only seven states, one of which is 
Massachusetts, that allow borrowing through solely legislative action with no limits on 
the amount or purpose of debt that may be incurred. The nineteen that require 
voter approval of borrowing include California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois, 
while states with constitutional debt ceilings include Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 
See also COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-17. 
70. L. GOODALL, supra note 65, at 18-20. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMMN. ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (1961). For a detailed state-by-state report on restrictions on 
local borrowing, including a discussion of relevant judicial decisions, see B. MANN &: 
F. BIRD, STA1E CoNSrITUTIONAL RESTRlcnONS ON LoCAL BORROWING AND PROPERTY TAXING 
POWERS (1965), 
71. L. GOODALL, supra note 65, at 24-25. Sometimes such limitations are imposed 
in the form of maximum tax rates that may be levied for debt service. U.S. ADVISORY 
COMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 70, at 27. The limitations are 
constitutional in about thirty states and imposed by statute in the others. L. GOODALL, 
supra, at 18. 
72. See text accompanying notes 166-70 infra, 
73. For a discussion of the decisions in which the bonds of special governments 
came to be seen as debt separate from that of the parent government, see text ac-
companying notes 166-79 infra, 
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'While the method of financing improvements through current 
revenue, if not through revenue bonds, was fairly well known in the 
early part of the nventieth century, it seems to have been less often 
employed than the creation of special districts with their own t:a..xing 
powers. The establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 
1921 first dramatized revenue-bond financing and popularized the 
designation "authority" for a device that used this method. The Port 
Authority, modeled after the Port of London Authority, was designed 
to supervise the over-all development of New York harbor.74 The 
harbor lies in both New Jersey and New York waters, and its develop-
ment had been hindered by duplication of facilities and by political 
rivalries and jealousies among the municipalities dotting the shores 
in both states. An interstate compact was drawn up, in which New 
York and New Jersey agreed to integrate development throughout 
the harbor. Thus, the prototype of the public authority was initially 
designed to solve a jurisdictional problem.76 Apparently, the method 
of financing through revenue bonds was devised only after the Au-
thority was in actual operation.76 At first the Authority was financed 
by a state grant; the states found it necessary to turn over to the Au-
thority projects already producing revenue in order to reassure bond 
buyers. Subsequently, the revenues and deficits of the various facilities 
were pooled, and the enterprise as a whole has been self-sustaining on 
revenue bonds alone.77 
The depression of the 1930's ushered in the era of real growth in 
the number of authorities. A nationwide decrease in the assessed 
value of ta..xable property plus increased resistance among taxpayers 
to government debt met head on with the desire of the federal gov-
ernment to aid economic recovery through the construction of public 
works.78 The model of the Port of New York Authority and its reli-
ance on bonds paid off through user charges rather than taxes offered 
a partial solution. In 1934, President Roosevelt sent a letter to all 
forty-eight governors suggesting that states and cities cooperate with 
the federal government in stimulating public works by (1) authorizing 
existing governmental units to issue revenue bonds, and (2) creating 
74. See generally E. BARD, THE PORT OF NEW YoRK AurnoRITY (1942); F. BIRD, A 
STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY (1949); Goldstein, The Port of New York 
Authority, 5 J. Pun. L. 408 (1956); Goldstein, An Authority in Action-An Account of 
the Port of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
715 (1961). 
75. Edelstein, supra note 9, at 181; SENA1E SPECIAL COMM. To INVESfIGA1E THE 
AcrIVITIES AND FUNC11ONS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, N.J. LEGIS,, REPORT 
OF SPECIAL SENATE INVESfIGATING COMM. UNDER SENA1E REs. No. 7 OF THE YEAR 1961, at 
7 (1962) [hereinafter N.J. SENATE REPORT]. 
76. See E. BARD, supra note 74, at 226-46. 
77. Id. at 265; N.J. SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 12-13. 
78. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
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new public corporations that could do the same.70 There was an al-
most unanimously favorable response from the states, and increas-
ingly the name "public authority" was applied to the revenue-fi-
nanced special governments. As contrasted with special districts, 
which typically were created by local governments to provide ser-
vices, authorities became primarily associated with state-initiated 
projects of capital construction, such as dams, bridges, electric power 
facilities, turnpikes, and buildings.80 World War II, which left a 
backlog of needs in areas of state responsibility, added momentum to 
this development, as did the unprecedented post-war demand for cap-
ital facilities to accommodate the increasingly mobile population.81 
Thus, while revenue bond issues totaled about 188 million dollars in 
1940, they reached about 600 million dollars in 1950, and 4 billion 
dollars in 1963.82 The number of special districts and authorities 
greatly increased as well.83 
One further indication of the success achieved by the larger au-
thorities by the mid-1960's is the fact that many of them had a surplus 
of funds. Not only did the Port of New York Authority build the 575 
million dollar World Trade Center with surpluses, it also took over 
the operation of the bankrupt Hudson and Manhattan Railroad, ab-
sorbing an 8 million dollar deficit in the first year in addition to 
spending 43 million dollars on modernization. 84 The surplus of the 
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority was a major point of con-
tention in the debate over the development of an integrated New 
York transportation system.85 In 1968, the New Jersey Highway Au-
thority opened a Garden State Arts Center with its surpluses,86 and a 
number of other already profitable authorities turned excess revenues 
or new bond issues into supplementary facilities or improvements on 
existing projects.87 
As would be expected, increased familiarity and continued suc-
cess with authorities has resulted in greater reliance upon them and 
a search for further problems to which they may be profitably ap-
plied. 
79. COUNCIL R.EPoRT, supra note 9, at 26-27; URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 247-48. 
80. URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 249. For a list of major authorities established 
in the 1930's and 1940's, see id. at 248-49. 
81. Gerwig, supra note 9, at 597. 
82. URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 250. 
83. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
84. The Super-Agency that Moves a Metropolis, Bus. WEEK, May 11, 1968, at 73, 93. 
85. URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 145-47, 255. See also J. DOIG, METROPOLITAN 
TRANSPORTATION PoLmcs AND THE NEW YORK REGION 39-40 (1966). 
86. URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 257. 
87. Id. at 256-57. 
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III. MULTICOUNTY AUTHORITIES 
Toward the end of the 1960's, there was a great outburst of 
growth in "multicounty authorities," special governments overlap-
ping traditional government boundaries and combining the financ-
ing methods of special districts and authorities. Their responsibilities 
to date have primarily been in the field of transportation: In the New 
York City area, a transportation authority covers the City and seven 
counties;88 in Kansas City, seven counties in two states;89 in Washing-
ton, D.C., the District of Columbia and three cities;90 in Detroit, 
si.x counties;91 in Niagara, two counties;92 in Minneapolis, seven 
counties;03 and in Boston, seventy-eight communities.94 
Multicounty authorities are already among the largest and most 
powerful of special governments and have the greatest potential im-
pact on urban affairs. In order to help evaluate what has been and 
can be done with these experimental bodies, several of them will be 
described in detail. 
A. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) 
The MT A was created in 1968 to unify responsibility for com-
muter transportation and related services, including air, water, and 
rail services, in the New York City area.95 The Authority has jurisdic-
tion over all of the City and in seven surrounding New York counties, 
but contiguous counties in New Jersey and Connecticut are not in-
88. New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, established in 1965 as the 
New York Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority by ch. 324, § 3 [1965] 
N.Y. Laws 1043, as amended, N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw §§ 1260-78 (McKinney 1970), as 
amended, N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw §§ 1263 to 1276-a (M:cKinney Supp. 1972). See text 
accompanying notes 95-II5 infra. 
89. Kansas City Arca Transportation Authority, established in 1965 by ch. ll5 [1965] 
Kan. Laws 261, as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2524 to -2535 (Supp. 1972), and H.B. 
No. 333 [1965] Mo. Laws 376 (codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 238.010-.100 (Supp. 1972)). 
90. Washington (D.C.) Metropolitan Arca Transit Authority, established in 1969 by 
Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324, as amended, National Capital 
Transportation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-143, 83 Stat. 320. See also D.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 1-431 to -436 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 317-1 to -86 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 56-529 to -530 (1969). 
91. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority, established in 1967 by No. 204 
[1967] Mich. Acts 276 (codified at 111cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 124.401-.425 (Supp. 1973)). 
92. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, established in 1967 by N.Y. Pun. 
AUTH. LAw §§ 1299 to 1299-s (McKinney 1970). 
93. Twin Cities Arca Metropolitan Transit Commission, established in 1967 by 
ch. 892 [1967] Minn. Laws 1891, as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473A.Ol-.18 (Supp. 
1973). 
94. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, established in 1964 by ch. 563 
[1964) Mass. Acts 429, as amended, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 161A, §§ 1-29 (1970). See text 
accompanying notes IIG-37 infra. 
95. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 1264(1) (McKinney 1970). 
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cluded.96 In the interest of a unified mass transportation policy, the 
MTA was given control over the extant New York City Transit Au-
thority (NYCTA) and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority 
by the device of making the MT A's directors ex officio (and the only) 
directors of the earlier two Authorities.97 The MTA has a chairman 
and ten other members, 98 at least nine of whom must reside in the 
area of the Authority's jurisdiction, and three of whom are to be ap-
pointed only on the recommendation of the mayor of New York 
City.oo 
The MT A has typical broad corporate powers100 and general gov-
ernmental powers, such as the powers to make surveys and recommen-
dations, subpoena witnesses in investigations, and do all things nec-
essary, convenient, or desirable to carry out its purposes.101 Unlike 
many other statutes creating authorities, the statute creating the 
MTA waives sovereign immunity and expressly consents to suits 
against the Authority.102 Special powers relating to transportation 
give the MTA virtually plenary authority over the entire range of 
transportation facilities. It may (I) acquire any transportation facil-
ity; (2) construct, maintain, improve, extend, or repair any such 
facility; (3) on a majority vote after a public hearing, establish and 
collect such tolls and charges for the use of its facilities as are nec-
essary to keep the operations self-sustaining; (4) establish schedules 
and standards of operation, including rules and regulations gov-
erning the conduct and safety of the public; (5) carry out any of 
its powers or duties through a subsidiary corporation; (6) receive 
grants; and (7) do all it deems necessary to manage and control its 
facilities.103 The Authority's rules and regulations prevail over con• 
flicting local laws and ordinances.104 
96. The Authority is authorized, however, to enter into agreements to build a 
New York-Connecticut bridge with any similar agency in Connecticut. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. 
LAw § 1266(9)(b) (McKinney 1970). 
97. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAw §§ 552(1), 1201(1) (McKinney 1970). 
98. The members are appointed by the governor for eight-year terms with the 
advice and consent of the state Senate, N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw § 1263(1) (McKinney Supp. 
1972), and are removable for cause by the governor, N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw § 1263(7) 
(McKinney 1970). 
99. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAw § 1263(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
100. E.g., the power to sue and be sued, to borrow money and issue bonds and notes, 
to invest funds in reserve or sinking funds, to make bylaws, to enter into contracts, to 
acquire property, and to appoint officers and employees. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAW § 1265 
(McKinney 1970), as amended, N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw § 1265 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
101. N.Y. Pun. Aura. LAw § 1265 (McKinney 1970). The Authority is supposed to 
continue operations as long as it has bonds or other obligations outstanding and 
until its existence is terminated by law. N.Y. Pun. Aura. LAw § 1263(8) (McKinney 
1970). 
102. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAw § 1276 (McKinney 1970). 
103. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAw §§ 1266(1)-(6), (8) (McKinney 1970). 
104. No other political subdivision has jurisdiction over any of the Authority's 
activities. N.Y. Pun. Aum. LAw § 1266(8) (McKinney 1970). 
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The MT A has the power to issue bonds backed only by its reve-
nues.105 The Authority itself has no taxing powers and cannot pledge 
the credit of the state; yet, it is empowered to receive state funds.106 It 
was probably anticipated that state funding would be necessary, since 
the NYCT A had been running at a revenue deficit greater than the 
Triborough's surplus.107 Indeed, in 1968, New York State voters ap-
proved a 2.5 billion dollar bond issue for transportation throughout 
the state, including MT A facilities.108 
Although the public service commission is explicitly declared not 
to have any authority over the MT A, there is some supervision of 
the Authority by state and local governments. Like all New York 
authorities, the MT A must submit to the governor and other state 
officials a detailed annual report on its finances and operations, as 
well as a budget report and an audit report after examination by 
the state comptroller.109 More direct control within the City of New 
York is exercised by the mayor, city council, and city board of 
estimate, through the power to veto certain activities relating to the 
NYCTA.110 
Lest the importance of political considerations be forgotten, it is 
worth noting that four plans for the organization of the MT A were 
hotly debated before the final choice was made.111 Commissioner 
Gilhooley of the NYCT A advocated a new authority with only man-
agerial responsibility; its capital budget was to be controlled by New 
York City.112 A second model, proposed by Mayor John Lindsay, 
would have continued the NYCT A and the Triborough Authority 
without merger but would have reorganized their boards and given 
the mayor a veto power over the actions of each.113 A third proposal, 
105. N.Y. Pun. Aura. LAw § 1269(1) (McKinney 1970). The Authority and the 
interest it pays to its bondholders arc exempt from state taxation. N.Y. Pun. Aura. 
LAw § 1275 (McKinney 1970). 
106. N.Y. Pun. Aura. LAw § 1266(6) (McKinney 1970). 
107. URBAN Aru:As, supra note 3, at 194. 
108. Id. at 212. 
109. N.Y. Pun. Aura. I.Aw §§ 2500-03 (McKinney 1970). See also N.Y. Pun. Aura. 
LAw § 1276-a (McKinney Supp. 1972) (Comptroller to make yearly audit of Authority 
books and records). 
ll0. The mayor and the board of estimate have the power to veto NYCTA projects 
with capital costs in excess of 1 million dollars. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw § 1203(l)(b) 
(ii) (McKinney 1970). In addition, the mayor, city council, and city board of estimate 
can veto the schedule of transit facilities authorized to be provided by the Transit 
Construction Fund, a separate corporate governmental agency administered by three 
trustees, two of whom arc appointed by the mayor. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAw §§ 1225-e, 
-g (McKinney Supp. 1972). The Construction Fund's purpose is to assist the MTA 
through agreements with the NYCTA to provide transit facilities. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. 
LAW§ 1225-d (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
111. For a study of the politics of transportation in the New York area up to 1966, 
see J. DOIG, MErROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PoLmc:s AND nm NEW YORK REGION (1966). 
ll2. See URBAN Aru:As, supra note 3, at 82-86. 
ll3. See id. at 136-38, 143-50. Under this proposal a new administrator of trans-
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put forward by State Senator Mackell, would have put both capital 
and expense budgets under the full control of the new authority, with 
a significant shift to state orientation provided by the requirement 
that the state make up any debt-service fund deficit.114 
The adopted plan was a modified version of a fourth proposal, 
suggested by Governor Rockefeller. Its strong state orientation is in-
dicated by its regional, rather than citywide, jurisdiction, its state 
funding, its provisions for appointment and removal of members by 
the governor, and its extensive powers within the City of New 
York.115 The differences in the proposals reflect different views of an 
authority's role in areawide planning and of where ultimate control 
should lie. Interestingly enough, none of the proposals envisioned a 
role for the electorate, either in approving the creation of the new 
authority, in electing its directors, or in voting specific funds for its 
projects. 
B. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
The MBTA is among the most interesting of the new authorities, 
primarily because it must accommodate the interests of seventy-eight 
cities and towns in the Boston area.116 The MBTA has the usual cor-
porate powers,117 and its powers over transportation are extensive. 
Within its jurisdiction the MBT A has exclusive power to provide 
mass transportation service; it is not subject to the control of any 
city, town, or other licensing authority.118 The MBT A may construct, 
extend, and modify mass transportation facilities110 and has the power 
of eminent domain.120 It may also establish, on a self-liquidating basis 
and backed by revenue bonds alone, separate units of mass transpor-
tation facilities.121 
portation would serve at the pleasure of the mayor as chairman of both authorities. 
Each authority would have an expense budget, but the capital budget of the NYCT A 
would be controlled by the city, while the Triborough Authority would continue to 
issue revenue bonds for its capital. Id. 
114. See id. at 166-78. 
115. See generally id. at 181-236. 
116. Provisions are made whereby cities and towns may elect to join the Authority, 
MASS. ANN. LA.ws ch. 161A, § 16 (1970), or discontinue local service, MASS. ANN. LAws 
ch. 161A, § 15 (1970). 
117. MASS. ANN. LA.ws ch. 161A, §§ 2-3 (1970) (e.g., power to sue and be sued). 
US. :MAss. ANN. LA.ws ch. 161A, § 3(i) (1970). The MBTA is subject to the Depart-
ment of Public Utilities in so far as safety of its equipment and operations is con-
cerned, but it is expressly provided that schedules and routes are not to be considered 
matters of safety and that the directors of MBT A shall exclusively determine the 
character and extent of the services and facilities to be furnished without the approval 
or direction of any state or municipal department, board, or commission. MAss. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 161A, § 3(i) (1970). 
119. :MAss. ANN. LA.ws ch. 161A, § 3(k) (1970). 
120. MAss. ANN. LA.ws ch. 161A, § 3(o) (1970). 
121. MAss. ANN. LA.ws ch. 161A, § 4 (1970). 
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The financing of the MBT A is fairly complicated but worthy of 
note. The Authority is authorized to issue bonds for one or more of 
three broad purposes: (I) to acquire and construct mass transporta-
tion facilities for express service; (2) to design and acquire, for itself 
or for lease to a private company, facilities to provide local service; 
and (3) to pay capital costs.122 A limit of 349 million dollars is placed 
on the value of bonds that may be outstanding at any given time.123 
Under certain circumstances the state participates in meeting Au-
thority obligations.12-1 
If the state is required to make payments, the cities and towns un-
der the jurisdiction of the Authority are to be assessed to reimburse 
the state. If there is a net cost of express service, seventy-five per cent 
of it is borne by the cities and towns in proportion to their respective 
number of commuters (with Boston paying at least thirty of the 
seventy-five per cent).125 Beginning in 1976,126 all cities and towns are 
to be assessed for the net cost of local service, half of the net cost in 
proportion to their populations and half in proportion to the amount 
of total losses attributable to their local routes.127 
The method of local control over the MBTA is unique. In addi-
tion to the five-member Board of Directors128-one of whom must be 
122. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 23 (Supp. 1972). Refunding bonds are authorized 
separately, and all bonds must mature within forty years. l\fAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, 
§ 23 (1970). 
123, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 23 (Supp. 1973). 
124-. The Commonwealth's office for administration and finance is authorized to 
enter into a contract under which the Commonwealth agrees to pay a portion of the 
net cost of service. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 28 (Supp. 1972). This assistance is 
limited primarily to the annual debt service on bonds issued before 1971 for which 
such a contract was made and the annual debt service on 90 per cent of the bonds (up 
to 257 million dollars worth) issued thereafter. l\fAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 28 (Supp. 
1972). However, if the Authority lacks enough cash to meet its obligations at any 
time during the year, the state will make the necessary payments, MAss. ANN. LAws 
ch. 161A, § 13 (1970), as it will at the end of the year if there has been a net cost of 
service, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 12 (1970). This latter case may be rare since all 
express service other than one named branch is to be operated so that no net cost of 
service other than debt service shall arise. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 5(d) (1970). 
If funds are not available at the time principal or interest comes due on a bond or 
note of the Authority, the state must also meet this obligation, and the Authority or 
any bondholder can require the state to pay. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 13 (1970). 
125. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 8 (1970). The same section of the statute provides 
that the other twenty-five per cent of the cost is borne by those cities or towns having 
express stations. 
126. A temporary plan for assessments to cover the cost of local service to fourteen 
cities and towns, paid by the state, was provided for the period from 1965 to 1975. See 
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 9 (1970). 
127. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, §§ 10-ll (1970). 
128. The governor appoints the directors, no more than three of whom may be of 
the same political party. They serve for five years with modest salaries and are re-
movable for cause by the governor. The Metropolitan Area Planning Council (on the 
structure and duties of the Planning Council, see MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, §§ 24-29 
(Supp. 1971)) approves two of them, the advisory board approves one, 14 cities and 
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experienced in transportation, one a member of organized labor, and 
one experienced in administration and finance129-the creating stat-
ute establishes an independent advisory board, which oversees the ac-
tions of the MBTA. No "substantial change in mass transportation" 
may be made without thirty-days' notice to the board.130 Also, the ad-
visory board must approve all fare changes131 and the mandatory 
periodic revisions of the MBTA's program for mass transportation.132 
Finally, an itemized budget must be passed by the board,133 and 
yearly reports must be sent to the board, the governor, and the gen-
eral court.134 
The advisory board, which acts by majority vote,135 consists of the 
city manager or mayor of the cities, and the chairman of the board of 
selectmen of the wwns affected by the MBTA.136 Each city and town 
has one vote plus additional votes or fractions thereof determined by 
multiplying one and one-half times the total number of cities and 
towns in the Authority by the percentage of all assessments that the 
given city or town has paid. Since assessments of cities and towns are 
based on the number of commuters for express service and on the per-
centage of population and proportionate net cost of service for local 
service, the votes are very roughly weighted according to population, 
although each city and town has at least one vote.137 
C. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD) 
Unlike the MTA and the MBTA, which took over existing facil-
ities, BAR TD was created primarily to construct a new transporta-
tion system. After years of planning and construction, BAR TD began 
operation in three counties in the summer of 1972.138 It has eminent 
towns approve one, and 64 cities and towns approve the last. l\!Ass, ANN. LAws ch. 161A, 
§ 6 (1970). The 14 cities and towns are all those with more than two full votes under 
the representation scheme discussed in the text accompanying note 137 infra. The direc-
tor elected by these units must receive the votes of at least four of the included 
municipalities. Since Boston has more votes than the other thirteen combined accord-
ing to the weighted-vote scheme, the director must in effect be approved by Boston 
and three other cities. MAss . .ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 6 (1970). 
129. l\!Ass. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 6 (1970). 
130, l\!Ass • .ANN. LAWS ch. 161A, § 5(f) (1970). 
131, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 5(e) (1970). 
132. l\!Ass. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 5(g) (1970). 
133. l\!Ass. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 5(i) (1970). 
134. l\!Ass. ANN. LAWS ch. 161A, § 5(h) (1970). 
135. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 6 (1970). 
136. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 161A, § 7 (1970). 
137. The number of votes must be redetermined at the beginning of each new 
year. The 14 cities and towns are those with more than two full votes out of a total 
of 195. Boston was allocated 73.29 votes, and Cambridge had the second greatest num-
ber, 10.56. The smallest of the 14 is Belmont, with 2.31 votes. This leaves 64 cities and 
towns, each with between one and two votes. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 161A, § 7 (1970). 
138. The enabling legislation created BARTD in 1957, at which time five counties 
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domain powers139 and the usual corporate powers,140 as well as ex-
plicit authority to fix rates by a two-thirds vote.141 BARTD is more 
locally than state oriented, since most of its ultimate financial sup-
port comes from local property taxes.142 General obligation bonds 
payable from the tax revenues are permissible, but the debt thus in-
curred must not exceed fifteen per cent of the assessed value of prop-
erty within the district.143 BARTD is also allowed to issue revenue 
bonds,144 and in constructing a crucial link in its system-an under-
water rapid transit tube connecting San Francisco and Oakland-it 
relied primarily on revenue bonds issued by the California Toll 
Bridge Authority and backed by the earnings of the San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge.145 
If the BAR TD board of directors unanimously approves a new 
project, the issuance of bonds for this purpose must be approved by 
a three-fifths majority of voters in a special referendum.146 No refer-
endum is required for the issuance of revenue bonds for the acquisi-
tion of equipment or rapid transit facilities if the issuance of general 
obligation bonds has been previously approved.147 
in the Bay Area were included. Ch. 1056, § 3 [1957] Cal. Stats. 2292 (codified at CAL. 
Pun. UTIL. CODE § 28600 (West 1965)). Two counties subsequently withdrew, leaving 
San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties. On the withdrawal of Marin and 
San Matc:o counties, see URBAN AREAs, supra note 3, at 272, 276-77. In 1964, the West 
Bay Rapid Transit Authority, see ch. 104 [1965] Cal. Stats. 1964 1st Extraordinary Sess. 
324 (codified at CAL. Pun. UnL. CODE App. 3 (West 1965)), was created to cover San 
Mateo county; it may link up with BARTD in the future. 
139. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CoDE §§ 28953-55 (West 1965). 
140. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE §§ 28950-51, 28970, 29010 (West 1965). 
141. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 29038 (West 1965). 
142. Ta.xes at a rate not greater than five cents per 100 dollars of assessed 
valuation of taxable property may be levied, but they are to be supplemental to 
revenues from the various facilities and are limited to actual requirements. CAL. Pun. 
UnL. CODE § 29123 (West 1965). There is provision for an additional property tax to 
meet all sums due (for principal and interest) on the district's general obligation bonds. 
CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 29121 (West 1965). In addition, a retail transaction and use 
ta.x (or alternate financing approved by the electorate) was required to be levied by 
the board of directors beginning in 1969, to be used to the extent of 150 million 
dollars plus costs and debt service to help finance the BARTD system. CAL. Pun. UTIL. 
CODE §§ 29140-44 (West Supp. 1973). 
143. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CoDE § 29150 (West 1965). 
H•i. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 29143 (West Supp. 1973). 
145. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE §§ 30771-78 (West 1969). 
146. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE §§ 29158, 29168 (West 1965), as amended, CAL. Pun. UTIL. 
CODE § 29158 (West Supp. 1973). If the board of supervisors of one of the member coun-
ties does not approve, a time period for further study and amendment is allowed so that 
unanimity may be achieved; if a county still does not approve, it must withdraw from 
BARTD. Failure to withdraw is taken as acquiescence in the last amended report. CAL. 
Pun. UTIL. CODE § 29157 (West 1965). 
147. CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 29240 (West 1965), as amended, CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE 
§ 29240 (West Supp. 1973). 
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In its selection of directors BAR TD also allows for more local in-
fluence than the MT A and the MBT A. Each county has a "city 
selection committee," composed of the mayor of each incorporated 
city within the county.148 This committee and each county's board 
of supervisors select BARTD's board of directors,140 who must be 
residents and voters of the county from which they are appointed.150 
Finally, all meetings of the board must be open to the public,m 
and an annual financial report is to be submitted to the cities and 
counties and to the general public on request.152 
D. The New York State Environmental 
Facilities Corporation (EFG) 
The purposes of the EFC, created in 1970 to replace the New 
York State Pure Waters Authority, are the "planning, financing, con-
struction, maintenance and operation" of sewerage collection and 
treatment systems, air pollution control facilities, water management 
and collection facilities, and solid waste disposal systems.158 Appar-
ently allowed to operate throughout the State of New York,154 the 
EFC may effect its purposes with regard to sewerage, for example, in 
various ways. First, it may contract with a municipality or state 
agency to provide facilities.155 Second, it may make construction loans 
to municipalities and state agencies.156 Third, it may contract to con-
struct and operate facilities on behalf of a municipality.167 
148. CAL. GoVT. CODE § 50270 (West Supp. 1973). 
149. Each county with a population of over 500,000 is represented by four directors, 
two chosen by its board of supervisors and two by its city selection committee. A county 
with a population of more than 350,000 but less than 500,000 has three directors, two 
appointed by its board of supervisors and one by its city selection committee. And a 
county with fewer than 350,000 citizens is represented by two directors, one chosen by 
each group. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28733 (West Supp. 1973). At present the board 
consists of eleven members serving four-year terms. URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 272. 
No provision is made for removal of directors. 
150. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28731 (West 1965). 
151. CAL. PUB, UTIL. CoDE § 28790 (West 1965). 
152. CAL, PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28770 (West 1965). 
153. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1283 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
154. Its activities are "on behalf of municipalities and state agencies"; it is to assist 
"municipalities, state agencies, the state and persons"; and its purposes are "for the 
benefit of the people of the state of New York.'' N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1283 (McKinney 
Supp. 1972). See also N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1285(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (Author-
ity's special powers allow it to deal with any municipality that meets certain condi-
tions). 
155. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1285(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
156. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1285(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
157. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1285(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972). If nine provisions, in-
cluding one requiring that the municipality's full faith and credit back its annual 
payments, are complied with, this contract can be converted into a lease-purchase 
arrangement whereby title to the facilities will eventually vest in the municipality. 
N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAw § 1285(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
June 1973] Comments 1397 
The EFC has other special powers, including the renting and 
leasing of facilities, advising and planning in certain matters upon 
request, and contracting with private firms for help in pilot proj-
ects.158 All of these powers, with regard to sewerage, were possessed by 
the old Pure ·waters Authority;159 when the EFC was created, similar 
powers with respect to air pollution control, water management, and 
storm water collection facilities were added.160 
Like a traditional authority, the EFC may issue bonds and notes.161 
It is expressly declared that neither the state nor any municipality 
shall be liable on these.162 Nevertheless, the state has a large role in 
financing the authority, for it is to appropriate money annually to 
make up any difference between the funds placed in reserve by the 
EFC and the maximum amount of principal and interest that may be-
come due in the succeeding year.163 
The EFC is controlled by seven directors serving six-year terms: 
the commissioner of environmental conservation, the commissioner 
of health, the commissioner of the office for local government, and 
four others appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of 
the senate.164 
E. The General Nature of the Muticounty Authority 
Although the new multicounty authorities derive considerable in-
spiration from the entities generally known as "authorities" and may 
indeed merge several of them (as does the NYMTA) or be financed in 
part by one (as is BAR TD) the four bodies described above combine 
features of both special districts and authorities.165 All depend to 
some extent on tax funds. Both the EFC and the NYMT A have a 
firm state commitment to back their financial obligations if necessary, 
so neither need rely solely upon revenue bonds. The MBT A is 
backed by state contributions and assessments upon the constituent 
cities and towns, and BARTD is founded on local property taxes. 
However, these multicounty authorities are not merely enormous 
special districts, for each relies heavily on revenue bonds and is com-
mited to finance services as much as possible through user charges. 
158. N.Y. Pun. Aum. I.Aw §§ 1285(4), (5), (8) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
159. New York State Pure Waters Authority Act, ch. 722, § 1, [1967] N.Y. Laws 1907, 
1912-17, as amended, Act of June 28, 1968, ch. 954, §§ 1-2, [1968] N.Y. Laws 2789, as 
amended, Act of May 26, 1969, ch. 1099, §§ 5-12, [1969] N.Y. Laws 2934. 
160. N.Y. Pun. Aum. I.Aw§ 1285-a (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
161. N.Y. Pun. Aum. I.Aw § 1290(l)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
162. N.Y. Pun. Aum. I.Aw§ 1290(8) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
163. N.Y. Pun. Aum. I.Aw § 1291(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
164. N.Y. Pun. Aum. I.Aw § 1282(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972). The directors are 
removable for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or misconduct. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 
1282(6) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
165. See URBAN AREAS, supra note 3, at 267-74. 
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Multicounty authorities are larger and more powerful than most 
traditional authorities and are able to undertake deficit operations 
because of their hybrid financing. However, they share many of the 
legal and policy problems of their predecessors. 
IV. LEGAL STATUS AND LEGAL ISSUES 
A. Constitutionality 
Challenges to public authorities under state constitutions fre-
quently attack the very concept of a special government-without 
distinction between those financed by taxes and those financed by 
revenue bonds. Therefore, most of the doctrines and issues found in 
cases involving special districts are equally relevant to those con-
cerning public authorities. 
The earliest and most common attacks on special governments as-
serted that they impermissibly circumvent the debt limitations on 
counties and municipalities. In most states, the courts have rejected 
this argument, emphasizing that each special government is an in-
dependent unit, subject to the debt limitation individually, if at 
all.166 Consequently, where the jurisdictions of a city, a county, and a 
number of special governments overlap, the total debt possible within 
a given area is vastly increased. Kennebec Water District v. City of 
Waterville167 has been cited168 as the first case holding that the debt of 
a special government169 is not to be considered in calculating the debt 
of a city. The court found that the debt limitation in the state consti-
tution applied only to cities and towns, and not to "quasi-municipal 
corporation[s]" such as the Water District.170 Another early case, 
Paine v. Port of Seattle,171 concluded that the special government in 
166. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935); Robertson 
v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935); City of Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 
48 P .2d 530 (1935). 
167. 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902). 
168. See, e.g., Note, supra note 64, at 131. At least one case reached the same result 
twelve years earlier. Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist., 133 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 
203 (1890). 
169. Despite its name, the Water District appears to have been an authority since 
it had no taxing power, 96 Me. at 256, 52 A. at 783, but paid its bondholders with reve-
nues from supplying water, 96 Me. at 258, 52 A. at 776. 
170. 96 Me. at 254, 52 A. at 782. Special districts and authorities are usually subject 
to statutory debt limitations. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 
847 (1935) (District held a municipal corporation; debt limitation statute applicable to 
municipal corporations); Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist., 133 Ill. 443, 
27 N.E. 203 (1891) (District held a municipal corporation; debt limitation statute ap-
plicable to municipal corporations); State v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 365 
Mo. 1, 275 S.W .2d 225 (1955) (all "political subdivisions" subject to debt limitation 
statute). At least one case, however, has suggested that, in the absence of a statutory 
provision, a special district is not subject to the debt limit for municipalities. City of 
Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935). 
171. 70 Wash. 294, 127 P. 580 (1912). 
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question was a "municipal corporation" subject to its own debt limi-
tation; it suggested that the Port's debt might be added to that of the 
general government if it could be shown that the legislature's sole 
purpose was to avoid the limitation.172 However, in the influential 
New York case, Robertson v. Zimmermann,173 the court gave no weight 
to the fact that, in creating the Buffalo Sewer Authority, the Common 
Council of Buffalo had been influenced by its finding that " 'the city 
because of its constitutional debt limitation cannot finance this un-
dertaking by bond issue.' "174 The court held: "The project consti-
tutes a self-liquidating public improvement. The Authority cannot 
pledge the credit of the city in any way, and its bonds are to be paid 
solely from the revenues of the 'Authority.' The act does not offend 
the provision of the Constitution referred to.''175 
The independent status of special districts and authorities has 
been the source of one response to the argument that they unconsti-
tutionally circumvent debt limitations. The "special fund" doctrine, 
a theory similar in result, allows counties and municipalities, as well 
as special governments, to operate revenue-producing projects with-
out adding to their recognized debt. According to this doctrine, con-
stitutional debt limitations only restrict that indebtedness that is to 
be satisfied from future taxation and do not affect those municipal 
obligations-or debts of authorities-that are payable solely from a 
"special fund" of revenues.176 This doctrine was accepted in Kelly v. 
Merry,177 which concerned a conditional sales contract made by a 
village for the purchase of machinery for a municipal lighting plant; 
payment was to be made solely from the revenues of the lighting 
system. The court rejected the contention that this arrangement 
created a debt of the village: "Although an obligation is created on 
the part of the village to collect the light rents and apply them to the 
payments due on the contract, the moneys thus raised are not a part 
172. 70 Wash. at 321, 127 P. at 582. For the view that a special government must be 
sufficiently separate from the general government in order to be treated as separate 
from the general government, see Reynolds v. City of Waterville, 92 Me. 292, 42 A. 
553 (1898); Ayer v. Commissioner of Administration, 340 Mass. 586, 165 N.E.2d 885 
(1960). 
173. 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). 
174. 268 N.Y. at 57, 196 N.E. at 742. 
175. 268 N.Y. at 63, 196 N.E. at 744. Accord, Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 244 
A.2d 281 (1968); Tranter v. Alleghany County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 A. 289 (1934). 
For other cases challenging authorities on debt limitation grounds, see California Toll 
Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal. 298, 298 P. 485 (1931); Opinion of the 
Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956); Application of Oklahoma Turnpike 
Authority, 203 Okla. 335, 221 P.2d 795 (1950). 
176. See generally Williams &: Nehemkis, supra note 65, at 186-201; Comment, 
Obligations of a State-Created Authority: Do They Constitute a Debt of the State?, 53 
MICH, L. REv. 439 (1955). 
177. 262 N.Y. 151, 186 N.E. 425 (1933). See also Department of Water &: Power v. 
Vroman, 218 Cal. 206, 22 P.2d 698 (1933). 
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of the general income of the village, for they are pledged to the pay-
ment of the special contract indebtedness.''178 
Although the special fund doctrine has been widely accepted,170 
the courts have had some difficulty applying it to building authorities 
where the city is to pay off the building bonds in yearly installments. 
If the court construes the arrangement as a lease, the payments are 
not debt under the common law rule that future rent is not debt; 
however, if the arrangement is seen as an installment contract, some 
or all of the contract price may be regarded as debt.180 Nevertheless, 
it can safely be said that the "separate entity" and special fund doc-
trines have in most states put revenue-bond financing beyond attack 
on the ground of the avoidance of debt limitations. 
A number of other attacks have been, and continue to be, 
launched against authorities under state constitutions. None of these 
has met with more than scattered success. In several cases it has been 
urged that the creation of an authority violates a prohibition on lend-
ing to private parties181 or on taking property by eminent domain for 
other than a public purpose.182 The definition of "public purpose" 
178. 262 N.Y. at 159, 186 N.E. at 428. 
179. See, e.g., Fox v. Bicknell, 193 Ind. 537, 141 N.E. 222 (1923); Interstate Power 
Co. v. Incorporated Town of McGregor, 230 Iowa 42, 296 N.W. 740 (1941); Winston v, 
City of Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895). See generally Gerwig, Public Authori• 
ties: Legislative Panacea?, 5 J. PUB. LAw 387, 393 (1956); Williams &: Nehemkis, supra 
note 65, at 189. See Foley, Some Recent Developments in the Law Relating to 
Municipal Financing of Public Works, 4 FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 28 &: n.73 (1935), for a list 
of states accepting or rejecting the doctrine. See also Williams &: Nehemkis, supra, at 
192-200, for exceptions to the special fund doctrine that may have some vitality. 
By 1951 all but seven states had passed legislation authorizing counties and 
municipalities to issue revenue bonds. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 27. Michigan 
has an interesting provision in its revenue-bond law whereby cities or counties can 
issue such bonds without voter approval unless a petition is signed by IO per cent of 
the voters within 30 days after notice of the proposed bonds is given by newspaper 
publication. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.133 (1967). 
In a number of states, counties and municipalities can finance services with addi-
tional property taxes without creating special districts through a statutory analogy to 
the special fund doctrine--"special taxing districts." GoVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, 
supra note 10, at 13, reports that 5,910 such special ta.xing districts exist in 21 states. 
See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 60000-163 (West 1966), as amended, CAL. GoVT. CODE 
§ 60000 (West Supp. 1973). 
180. Compare Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 A. 501 (1936) (leaseback contract im-
permissible) with Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937) (straight lease permis-
sible). See generally COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 95-100; Gerwig, supra note 179, 
at 393-95; Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around 
Debt Limitations, 25 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 377 (1957); Morris, supra note 65, at 250-63; 
Comment, supra note 176. 
181. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 724-25, 113 N.E.2d 425, 468-69 
(1953); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 258, 169 A.2d 634 (1961); New Jersey Sports 
&: Exposition Authority v. Mccrane, 119 N.J. Super. 459, 472-93, 292 A.2d 580, 589-91 
(1971); Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 P. 580 (1912). 
182. See, e.g., Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 
(1902); Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 
665 (1939); Behnke v. New Jersey Hwy. Authority, 13 N.J. 14, 29-30, 92 A.2d 647, 654-55 
(1953). 
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has been greatly extended beyond the traditional class of "govern-
mental" endeavors, 183 so authorities constructed for such operations 
as transportation facilities, housing projects, industrial development 
parks, and even recreation facilities184 have survived this line of 
attack.185 
Other constitutional objections against state-created authorities 
that have met with little success in the courts include the arguments 
that authorities violate "home rule" provisions,186 that they constitute 
an improper delegation of legislative powers,187 that they violate pro-
hibitions on the use of special acts where general acts could be used, 188 
and that the legislature has no power to create novel forms of local 
government.189 
Since multicounty authorities, unlike traditional authorities, rely 
in part on tax funds, those multicounty authorities governed by 
appointed officials may also be faced with a "taxation without rep-
resentation" argument that has previously been urged only against 
special districts. This challenge, however, has met with a cool re-
ception in the courts. One response of the courts has been to reject 
outright the notion that there exists any constitutional right to 
vote for the officials who impose taxes.190 Another response is to 
183. Note, supra note 64, at 125-29. See also Recent Development, "Public Purpose" 
in Municipal Financing Plans, 42 WASH. L. REv. 294 (1966). 
184. See New Jersey Sports &: Exposition Authority v. Mccrane, ll9 N.J. Super. 457, 
292 A.2d 580 (1971). 
185. Note, supra note 64, at 125-29. 
186. See, e.g., Santa Barbara County ·water Agency v. All Persons &: Parties, 47 Cal. 
2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (1957); Metropolitan Transp. Authority v. County of Nassau, 28 
N.Y.2d 385, 271 N.E.2d 213, 322 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1971); Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N.Y. 417, 
198 N.E. 13 (1935); Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 
446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960). But see People ex rel. Board of Park Commrs. v. Common 
Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 (1873); State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 
Ill P. 734 (1910). This argument was discussed in Brooks, The Metropolis, Home Rule, 
and the Special District, II HASTINGS L.J. IIO (1959). On "home rule" in general, see Mac-
chiarola, Local Government, Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. URBAN L. 335 (1971); 
Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. &: MARY L. REv. 
269 (1968). 
187. See, e.g., Application of Okla. Turnpike Authority, 221 P.2d 795, 203 Okla. 
335 (1950); Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937); Tranter v. Allegheny County 
Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 A. 289 (1934); Clarke v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 
177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481 (1935). 
188. See, e.g., Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist., 133 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 203 
(1890); Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors, 300 Mich. 1, 
1 N.W.2d 430 (1942). 
189, See, e.g., People ex rel. Witson v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37 (1869); People ex rel. 
Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857); Brockenbrough v. Board of Water Commrs., 134 
N.C. I, 12-13, 46 S.E. 28, 33-34 (1903). 
190. See, e.g., State ex ,·el. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 
464, 483, 166 N.E. 407, 413 (1929): "We are not, however, able to find any provision in 
the [Ohio] Constitution which limits the power to levy taxes to elected officials, as dis-
tinguished from those who are appointed to office." See also Golden Gate Bridge &: Hwy. 
Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P.2d 585 (1931); City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 
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hold that voter approval of the creation of the district is a sufficient 
substitute for the election of its officials.191 One early case, Van 
Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners,192 did hold that 
the New Jersey legislature could not constitutionally delegate dis-
cretion to determine the amount of taxes to be levied to a sewerage 
district that previously had "no governmental functions."193 How-
ever, such a body would not receive a similar characterization to-
day.194 In addition, the Passaic Valley court was particularly worried 
by the commissioners' almost unlimited discretion as to the amount 
of tax to be levied,195 while modern special government legislation 
very carefully limits the permissible rate of ta.xation.196 As a result, 
the Passaic Valley case does not pose a substantial threat to the 
taxing power of special governments. 
Two of the multicounty authorities discussed above have been 
challenged on constitutional grounds with predictable lack of success. 
In City of Rye v. J.11:etropolitan Transportation Authority,191 it was 
argued that the creation of the MT A was not by "special act" as re-
quired by the constitution of New York because the creating statute 
dealt with other matters as well. The court held that the constitu-
tional provision meant only that such a public corporation must be 
created by the state legislature itself, rather than by a local gov-
ernment or an administrative officer.198 In another attack on the 
MTA, Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. County of Nas-
sau,199 the court held that the MTA is not a "super-local govern-
ment" with an unconstitutional power to tax because it merely 
collects charges as empowered by the legislature. Further, the MT A 
does not violate the constitution's "home rule" provision, for it affects 
a large portion of the state.200 The MBTA has also survived consti-
tutional attack, in Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. 
653, 269 P. 630 (1928); Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist., 133 Ill. 443, 27 
N.E. 203 (1890). 
191. See, e.g., City of Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); Municipality 
of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960). 
192. 71 N.J.L. 574, 60 A. 214 (1905). 
193. 71 N.J.L. at 583, 60 A. at 217. 
194. See, e.g., Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commn., 187 Md. 
67, 48 A.2d 593 (1946); Hampton Roads Sanitary Dist. Commn. v. Smith, 193 Va. 371, 
86 S.E. 497 (1952). 
195. 71 N.J.L. at 585, 60 A. at 216. 
196. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 29120-31 (West 1965). 
197. 24 N.Y.2d 627, 249 N.E.2d 429, 301 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1969). 
198. 24 N.Y.2d at 634, 249 N.E.2d at 432, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73. 
199. 28 N.Y.2d 385, 271 N.E.2d 213, 322 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1971). 
200. 28 N.Y.2d at 390-91, 271 N.E.2d at 214-15, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 230-31. The court also 
rejected the argument that the MT A is an improperly created state agency that un-
constitutionally disburses money without legislative appropriation. 28 N.Y.2d at 390, 
271 N.E. at 214-15, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 230. 
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Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,201 where the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held, among other things,202 that the provi-
sions for the apportionment of the net transportation costs among 
the constituent cities and tmvns are reasonable "deviations from an 
ideal apportionment plan" in view of the cost and complexity of 
alternative schemes.203 It was also decided that the statute does not 
entail a forbidden loan of credit to private parties because the 
benefit, if any, to private transportation companies is indirect and 
incidental.204 
Authorities have thrived in the face of a barrage of constitutional 
objections. Although an occasional court frowns upon a certain au-
thority, and although each new authority must almost invariably 
run the gauntlet of constitutional attacks, the constitutionality of the 
device is now firmly established in most states.205 
B. One Person-One Vote 
Although authorities may withstand attacks on their existence 
brought under state constitutions, the possibility must be considered 
that a particular form of electoral control over these bodies is man-
dated by the federal constitution under the one person-one vote 
doctrine. The Supreme Court first articulated the principle that elec-
toral districts must be apportioned as nearly as possible on an equal 
population basis in the well-known cases of Baker v. Carr,206 Wes-
berry v. Sanders,201 and Reynolds v. Sims,208 which were concerned 
with congressional and state legislative districts.209 Several cases in-
volving various kinds of local governments have developed the prin-
ciple in holdings relevant to public authorities.210 
201. 348 Mass. 538, 205 N.E.2d 346 (1965). See also Town of Milton v. Massachusetts 
Bay Transp. Authority, 356 Mass. 467, 253 N.E.2d 844 (1969) (dealing with procedures 
followed by the advisory board). 
202. The court also ruled that the purposes of the statute, the statutory standards 
for Authority action, and the provisions for borrowing money are constitutional. 348 
Mass. at 542-57, 205 N.E.2d at 350·59. 
203. 348 Mass. at 562, 205 N.E.2d at 362. 
204. 348 Mass. at 558, 205 N.E.2d at 360. 
205. See COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 101. But see Quirk &: Wein, supra note 
3, at 579-80 n.347, 597, who conclude, after an extensive analysis of the New York expe-
rience, that authorities are created for anti-democratic purposes and are unconstitutional 
in a variety of ways. 
206. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
207. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
208. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
209. See generally Auerbach, Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One 
Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. l; Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips and Dumbbells 
-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment'!, 75 YALE L.J. 1300 (1966); Reapportionment Sys-
posium, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209 (1964); Comment, Legislative Reapportionment-The 
Scope of Federal Judicial Relief, 1965 DUKE L.J. 563; Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. 
L. REv. 1226 (1966). 
210. The applicability of the one person-one vote doctrine to local governments in 
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Two 1967 cases211 hint that there will be a greater tolerance when 
local, rather than congressional and state, legislative districts are in-
volved.212 Sailors v. Board of Education213 involved county school 
boards the members of which were chosen by delegates from local 
school boards. Each local board was elected by popular vote and, re-
gardless of the population it represented, sent one delegate to the 
selection meeting. The court characterized this system of selection as 
"basically appointive rather than elective" since the county board 
members were selected, not by the general electorate, but by the 
delegates from local school boards without regard to the wishes of 
the electorate.214 Because no. election was involved, the principle 
of one person-one vote was held inapplicable. And since the board 
was found to perform "essentially administrative" functions215 the 
Court held that the state was free to choose among methods of 
selecting its officials: "We find no constitutional reason why state 
or local officers of the nonlegislative character involved here may 
not be chosen by the governor, by the legislature, or by some other 
appointive means rather than by an election."216 The Court em-
phasized the importance to local governments of flexibility in deal-
ing with changing urban conditions.217 The question of whether a 
state is required to provide for the election of a local legislative 
body rather than for its appointment was not decided.218 
general has received substantial attention. See, e.g., Herget, The Impact of the Four-
teenth Amendment on the Structure of Metropolitan and Regional Governments, 23 
HASTINGS L.J. 763 (1972); Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Deci-
sions on Counties and Other Forms of loJ:unicipal Government, 65 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 21 
(1965); Symposium-One Man-One Vote and Local Government, 36 GEO. WASH.LR.Ev. 
689 (1968); Note, Reapportionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Rep-
resentation or Equal Vote!, 50 B.U. L. REv. 231 (1970); Comment, The Impact of i'oter 
Equality on the Representational Structures of Local Government, 39 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 
639 (1972). 
211. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Davis v. Dusch, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). 
212. See also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), in which a deviation of 11.9 per 
cent from exact equality in district population was allowed a county board of supervi-
sors. In fact, Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), which allowed a 16 per cent popula-
tion variation in regard to the Virginia General Assembly on the ground that it re-
sulted from the state's rational objective of preserving the integrity of the boundaries 
of political subdivisions, made it clear that the requirements of the one person-one 
vote doctrine are less strict even when applied to state, as opposed to congressional, 
districts. 
213. 387 U.S. 105 (1967). 
214. 387 U.S. at 109-10 &: n.6. 
215. The board's powers did, however, include preparing an annual budget and levy-
ing taxes. 387 U.S. at 110 n.7. 
216. 387 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added). The Court did note, however, that a state 
could not "manipulate its political subdivisions so as to defeat a federally protected 
right, as, for example, by realigning political subdivisions so as to deny a person his 
vote because of race." 387 U.S. at 108. 
217. 387 U.S. at ll0-11. 
218. 387 U.S. at 109-10. 
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In Dusch v. Davis,219 decided on the same day as Sailors, the Su-
preme Court upheld a plan for the consolidation of three urban and 
four rural boroughs that provided that the eleven councilmen of the 
resulting city were all to be elected at large, while each of the city's 
seven boroughs, which varied considerably in population, was to be 
the residence of at least one councilman. Although the Court assumed 
arguendo that the one person-one vote principle required by Reyn-
olds governed municipal legislative bodies, the residence require-
ment was not found to be fatal. The consolidation plan, the Court 
said, used boroughs " 'merely as the basis of residence for candidates, 
not for voting or representation,' "220 since the affected councilmen 
were responsible to the entire city electorate rather than to the resi-
dents of the borough in which they resided.221 As in Sailors, the Court 
recognized the need for flexibility in local government: "The Seven-
Four Plan seems to reflect a detente between urban and rural commu-
nities that may be important in resolving the complex problems of 
the modem megalopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the 
rural countryside."222 
However, in Avery v. :Midland County,223 the Court for the first 
time squarely applied the one person-one vote doctrine to local gov-
ernments. The Court held unconstitutional a plan whereby each of 
four districts in Midland County, Texas, elected one commissioner 
to the County Commissioners Court, the governing body of the 
county, when one of the districts contained over ninety-five per cent 
of the county's population.224 
Distinguishing "special-purpose" governmental units, the major-
ity opinion by Justice White said, "Our decision today is only that 
the Constitution imposes one ground rule for the development of 
arrangements of local government: a requirement that units with 
general governmental powers over an entire geographic area not be 
apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal 
population."225 Noting such powers as ta..xation, bond issuing, and 
219. 387 U.S. 112 (1967). 
220. 387 U.S. at 115, quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965). 
221. The Court suggested that a different result might ensue if a councilman in fact 
represented only one borough, if the plan were a scheme to avoid the consequences of 
reapportionment, or if it cancelled the voting strength of racial or political elements. 
387 U.S. at 116-17. See also White v. Regester, 41 U.S.L.W. 4885 (U.S., June 18, 1973). 
222. 387 U.S. at 117. 
223. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
224. The fact that the state legislature that created the districts might be properly 
apportioned was of no relevance to the question of whether the districts met the equal 
representation test. 390 U.S. at 481. 
225. 390 U.S. at 485-86. The Court also rejected the argument that the Commission• 
ers Court's functions were more "administrative" than "legislative" and thus need not 
be equally apportioned, 390 U.S. at 482-85, even though the Texas supreme court had 
found that the legislative functions of this body were "negligible," Avery v. Midland 
County, 406 S.W.2d 422, 426 (1966). 
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budget-making, the Court concluded that the Commissioners Court 
was such a body.226 
Again emphasizing the complexity of local government, the Court 
issued a caveat: "Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose 
unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting 
definable groups of constituents more than other constituents, we 
would have to confront the question whether such a body may be 
apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most 
affected by the organization's functions."221 However, Justices Harlan 
and Fortas, in separate dissents, were not convinced by the Court's 
distinction between special-purpose units and those with "general 
governmental powers."228 Justice Harlan foresaw "undesirable 'freez-
ing' effects on local government," such as the hindrance of the devel-
opment of metropolitan governments based on a compromise between 
central city and suburban representation.229 Justice Fortas felt that 
the distinction between special-purpose and general governments was 
not justified by the difference in their powers: "The functions of 
many county governing boards, no less than the governing bodies of 
special-purpose units, have only slight impact on some of their con-
stituents and a vast and direct impact on others."230 
The prediction of the dissent that the logic of Avery could not be 
restricted to general-purpose governments appears to have been ful-
filled in Hadley v. Junior College District,231 where the Court held, 
"as a general rule," that the one person-one vote doctrine applies to 
any state or local governmental unit that selects its officials by elec-
tion.232 In that case, the Court upheld a challenge brought by resi-
dents of a Kansas City junior college subdistrict that contained ap-
proximately sixty per cent of the district population to a statutory 
apportionment plan that permitted them to elect only fifty per cent 
of the college's trustees. The Court did not wholly abandon the 
Avery test: 233 "We feel that these powers, while not fully as broad as 
those of the Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the 
226. 390 U.S. at 483-84. 
227. 390 U.S. at 483-84. 
228. Justice Harlan, for example, called the Commissioners Court "slightly special-
ized." 390 U.S. at 492. 
229. 390 U.S. at 492-94. 
230. 390 U.S. at 500. 
231. 397 U.S. 50 (1970). 
232. 397 U.S. at 56. 
233. 397 U.S. at 53-54. It is arguable that Radley is not as great an extension of 
Avery as it might seem. The court in Radley docs mention the special status of educa• 
tion; perhaps the election of the junior college trustees could be said to be as important 
to the Kansas City voters as the election of county commissioners was to the Midland 
voters in Avery. The Court's opinion notes, however, that it would be impossible to try 
to determine how important an individual election is to the average voter. 397 U.S. at 
54-56. See also Comment, supra note 210, at 647 n.54. 
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trustees perform important governmental functions within the dis-
tricts, and we think these powers are general enough and have suffi-
cient impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the 
principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied here." 
However, the language of Hadley suggests that the Court puts 
little weight on the "general governmental powers" characterization. 
In Hadley the existence of an election was emphasized, not its pur-
pose. The majority rejected any test based upon the "importance" 
of an election, feeling that the decision of the state to choose an 
official by election is sufficient indication of his importance.234 It 
also refused to distinguish between "legislative" and "administra-
tive" officials.235 Justice Black, for the majority, did leave a small 
crack in the door for "certain functionaries whose duties are ... 
far removed from normal governmental activities and . . . dispro-
portionately affect different groups . . .. "236 Moreover, the Dusch 
approach in at-large elections with limited residency restrictions and 
the Sailors approach where officials are appointed were cited with 
approval.237 But, after Hadley238 the conclusion is hard to resist 
that once a state decides to elect officers, equality of voting power 
is required for almost any unit of local government.239 
234. 397 U.S. at 55. 
235. 397 U.S. at 55-56. 
236. 1197 U.S. at 56. 
237. 397 U.S. at 58-59. 
238. Justice Harlan, again in dissent, stated that the decision "forebodes, if indeed 
it does not decide, that the rule is to be applied to every elective public body, no matter 
what its nature." 397 U.S. at 60. He further argued that the need for local flexibility at 
least suggests that the Avery test be retained and that the Court from time to time face 
difficult issues of what are general governmental powers. 397 U.S. at 61-63. 
239. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that the nature of a par-
ticular special government may justify the election of its officials by only a certain seg-
ment of the population despite the one person-one vote doctrine. In Salyer Land Co. v. 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), the Court, relying on the 
e.xception noted by Justice Black in Hadley, 410 U.S. at 727-28, quoting 397 U.S. at 56 
(see te.xt accompanying note 236 supra), upheld a plan whereby only landowners were 
permitted to vote for the directors of the District and where the number of votes 
possessed by each landowner was proportionate to the assessed value of his land. Justice 
Rehnquist, for the majority, pointed out that the activities of the District had a dis-
proportionate effect upon landowners as a class and also that the District had a special 
limited purpose. 410 U.S. at 728. Despite its powers to plan and execute projects " 'for 
the acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of 
water,'" 410 U.S. at 723, quoting CAL. WATER CODE § 42200 (West 1966), and its ability 
to fix charges for the use of water and assess the costs of its projects against district land, 
410 U.S. at 724, he characterized the District as without "normal governmental" au-
tl1ority: "It provides no other general public services such as schools, housing, transpor-
tation, utilities, roads or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal 
body •••• There are no towns, shops, hospitals or other facilities designed to improve 
tl1e quality of life within the district boundaries and it does not have a fire department, 
police, buses, or trains." 410 U.S. at 728-29. Justice Douglas, with whom Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall concurred, dissented strongly in Salyer and its companion case, 
Associated Enterprise, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973), 
arguing that the tests laid down in Avery and Hadley of "perform[ing] important gov-
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Taking these cases together, it is clear that, although not all the 
questions are answered, the one person-one vote doctrine applies to 
many authorities. Its application will depend on whether or not the 
officials in question are elected. I£ an authority elects any of its direc-
tors, Hadley would seem to require that there be equal representa-
tion from constituent units.240 The powers of most authorities over 
such services as water supply, transportation, and pollution control 
will be at least as great as those of the Midland County Commission-
ers Court or the Kansas City Junior College District and will thus be 
considered "general governmental powers," if that concept retains 
any vitality.241 Not even all authorities that do elect some officials, 
however, need worry about apportionment standards; their directors 
may well be elected at large. Moreover, under Dusch an authority 
embracing several counties or cities within a single county can appar-
ently elect its directors at large and yet impose certain residency re-
quirements.242 Thus, it is probable that only those authorities with 
elected directors that represent constituent counties or cities are re-
quired to apportion. 
The application of the one person-one vote doctrine to multi-
county authorities, which by definition are composed of constituent 
parts, may threaten various accommodations that might be worked 
out between the central city and surrounding suburban or rural 
areas.243 Suppose, for instance, that the advisory board of the Mas-
ernmental functions •.• hav[ing] sufficient impact throughout the district" were met 
by these special districts. 410 U.S. at 749, quoting Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasis 
added by Toltec dissent). 
240. That is to say, either the districts from which officials are elected must be ap-
proximately equal in population, or, perhaps, if officials are from districts of varying 
population, their votes must be weighted according to how many people they represent. 
In 1967, it was estimated that only 25 per cent of "local governing boards" were elected 
from districts or elected at large subject to district residence requirements. Avery v. 
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 n.7 (1968), quoting Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 22 n.31, Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967). 
241. It might be suggested that certain specialized authorities qualify for the one 
person-one vote loophole in Tulare Lake for units "far removed from normal govern-
mental activities and ... disproportionately affect[ing] different groups." 410 U.S. at 
927-28, quoting Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56. This loophole is probably illusory, however, in 
cases dealing with whether equal weight must be given to votes cast from different areas, 
rather than, as in Tulare Lake, with whether the vote may be limited to certain classes 
of voters. Any activity undertaken on a scale that entails representation from a number 
of different districts is unlikely to be characterized as lacking sufficient general impact. 
At any rate, none of the metropolitan multicounty authorities discussed above could be 
so characterized. 
242. In White v. Regester, 41 U.S.L.W. 4885, 4889 & n.10 (U.S., June 18, 1973), the 
Court indicated that such an arrangement might even be preferred if in its absence 
"opportunity for racial discrimination" might be enhanced because all candidates could 
be selected from the majority areas. 
243. This was suggested by the dissents in Hadley, 397 U.S. at 60-61 (Harlan, J.), and 
Avery, 390 U.S. at 490-94 (Harlan, J.). 
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sachusetts Bay Transportation Authority244 were its governing body. 
As the board now stands, with each of the cities and tmvns having 
at least one vote plus additional votes and fractions based upon 
population,245 Boston has 73.29 votes out of a total of 195. Under 
a strict one person-one vote calculation, roughly estimated by sub-
tracting one vote from each city's allocation, leaving only the amount 
based upon population, Boston would have 72.29 votes of a total 
of 117. The consequent dominance of Boston might make the sur-
rounding cities think twice before they joined the Authority. Nor 
is it difficult to imagine similar situations in which compromise 
efforts at metropolitan governance would be politically impossible 
under the one person-one vote doctrine.246 As a practical matter, 
it does not seem improbable that some state legislatures will regard 
the circumvention of the complications of metropolitan representa-
tion as one reason for making the positions in areawide authorities 
appointive rather than elective.247 
The ways in which authorities that have no direct popular elec-
tions select their directors must be evaluated individually. Under 
Sailors most, if not all, of the authorities with appointed direc-
tors would avoid apportionment problems.248 In addition, a plan 
such as that provided for BARTD,249 whereby elected local officials 
from several constituent areas of varying size select authority direc-
tors, would seem to be appointive by analogy to Sailors.250 A system 
of appointment of directors combined with a residency requirement 
would not appear to violate the one person-one vote doctrine by 
analogy to the at-large elections in the Dusch case.251 
The practice of making certain elected officials ex officio members 
of authority boards252 raises a problem of characterization. If the 
mayors of the cities within a county automatically become members 
244. See text accompanying notes 130-37 supra. 
245. The vote allocation procedure is described in text accompanying note 137 supra. 
246. See, e.g., Huston, Special Service Districts in a City-County Consolidation: Con-
flict Between Metropolitan Reform and "One Man-One Vote" in Indianapolis, 47 IND. 
L.J. 101 (1971). 
247. But see McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36 GEO. WASH. L. 
R.Ev. 713, 731-32 (1968). 
248. In 1965, it could perhaps be said that it was "rather farfetched" to argue that 
appointed officials should come from constituent areas of nearly equal population, be-
cause authorities then typically relied solely on user charges. Weinstein, supra note 210, 
at 34. This argument is no longer quite so strained because of the appearance of multi-
county authorities financed by property taxes and/or state funds as well as user charges. 
249. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra. 
250. Compare text following note 213 supra. 
251. Such a system has been upheld by a court relying on Sailors. See People ex rel. 
Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971). 
252. See COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 42-44; Tobin, supra note 36, at 148. 
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of the board of a countywide authority, are they appointed or 
elected?253 It may be that elected officials from various cities or coun-
ties are made directors of an authority that embraces them all because 
they are expected to represent their constituencies, in which case 
the one person-one vote principle should apply because they are, 
in effect, elective.254 This situation is unlike Sailors, where elected 
local officials selected county board members without regard to the 
wishes of the electorate. The Court characterized the system in 
Sailors as appointive because "the county board is not determined, 
directly or indirectly, through an election in which the residents of 
the county participate. "255 When local officials automatically become 
directors, an election by the local residents is determinative of the 
position, which ought therefore to be characterized as elective.256 
Given the variety of organizational forms used by authorities, 
special problems are inevitable. For instance, if major new capital 
projects, bond issues, and tax changes undertaken by an authority 
must be approved by the general electorate,257 the case for applying 
the one person-one vote principle is not so compelling.258 Division 
of powers among an authority, a state, and affected local govem-
253. In Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405,255 N.E.2d 142, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1969), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970), where elected presidents of boroughs of varying popu-
lation were made ex officio voting members of a board of estimate, the New York Court 
of Appeals upheld the arrangement, but on the pre-Hadley ground that the board did 
not have general governmental powers. The court did not reach the issue of whether 
the board members were "elected" or "appointed." See also Cohen v. Hoye, 280 A.2d 
778, 783-84 (Me. 1971); Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 112 N.J. Super, 89, 
270 A.2d 418 (1970). 
254. A system of weighted votes or some similar plan might then be necessary to 
assure equal representation. See Dixon, Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some 
Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation, Community Action, Metros, and One Man-
One Vote, 58 GEO. L.J. 955, 979-80 (1970); Weinstein, supra note 210, at 40-49; Note, 
supra note 210, at 260, 
As a practical matter, however, it could be that appointments are made ex officio, 
not because elected officials represent the respective interests of their constituencies, but 
because it is an easy, shortcut method of appointing presumably competent people. 
255. 387 U.S. at 109-10 n.6. 
256. The same argument suggests that whenever a local elected official has the power 
to appoint a member of an authority and when the board of directors is made up of a 
number of similarly appointed directors from constituent cities or counties, then the one 
person-one vote principle should apply because each appointee theoretically represents 
his governmental unit. This is to be distinguished from the situation in which one 
elected official, such as the mayor, has the power to appoint all the directors of a city 
or county authority. Here the mayor is presumably representing all the people of his 
city, so no one person-one vote problems arise. The latter situation is analogous to ap-
pointment by the governor or the state legislature; when the appointer represents all 
the people of the jurisdiction over which the authority is given power and not just a 
component, smaller unit, the one person-one vote principle should be inapplicable. 
257. Bond issue approval is required in BARTD. See text accompanying note 146 
supra. 
258. For one thing, this would leave the authority with independent responsibility 
only for operating facilities, rather than for planning them, and would cut against 
finding the authority to be so "governmental" that its directors must be elected. 
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ments could also prove troublesome. In the MBT A, for instance, 
the advisory board, composed of ex officio members, approves one 
director appointed by the governor,2~9 a power that probably does 
not raise one person-one vote problems. However, the board also 
has more substantive powers, such as veto power over the Authority's 
budget, its program for mass transportation, and its fare changes.260 
Can it be said that the one person-one vote principle applies to a 
body staffed with ex officio members that has veto powers over an 
authority with appointive directors? 
In addition to the problems that arise under a given selection 
system, there is the further issue of when, if ever, the officials of a 
given government must be elected rather than appointed. It seems un-
likely that a state legislature would ever attempt to change tradition-
ally elective city or county offices into appointive ones. However, the 
same effect could be achieved by the creation of a multicounty au-
thority that has appointed directors and broad powers approaching 
those of a general government. In Sailors, the Supreme Court held 
that the officers of an "administrative" body need not be elected but 
reserved this question as to a "legislative" body.261 The Avery court, 
however, found this distinction difficult to apply.262 A more useful 
distinction may be that discussed in Avery, between general govern-
mental and special powers.263 Although Hadley may have devalued 
this test for purposes of deciding which elections require the ap-
plication of the one person-one vote principle, it may yet be useful 
in determining whether some offices must be elective. It is one 
thing to say that a legislature need not provide for the election of 
a director of an authority the only specific responsibility of which 
is managing the waterworks; it is another thing entirely to con-
clude that the legislature can do this in the case of a director of an 
authority that can promulgate rules, assess taxes, exercise the power 
of eminent domain, direct its own police force, and plan economic 
development over a metropolitan area.264 This issue is likely to_ be 
259. See note 128 supra. 
260. See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra. 
261. 387 U.S. at 109-10. 
262. 390 U.S. at 482. 
263. 390 U.S. at 483-85. 
264. The constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government in article IV, 
section 4, applies only to the states and probably could not be used to argue that a state 
has no power to provide for the appointment rather than the election of officials who 
exercise full governmental powers at the local level. See O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 
(1915). Other arguments could be made, however. For example, a doctrine of inherent 
right to local self-rule was once advanced and might be revived. See generally Eaton, The 
Right to Local Self Government (pts. 1-3), 13 HARV. L. REv. 441, 470, 638 (1900); McBain, 
The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self Government, 16 CoLUM. L. REv. 190 
(1916). 
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raised in the context of multicounty authorities,265 especially if they 
evolve into multifunctional authorities. 
C. Sovereign Immunity in Tort 
Once the constitutionality of the existence and organization of a 
special government has been established, the question arises of 
whether such a body partakes of certain immunities granted to gen-
eral governments. For instance, many courts have assumed that in 
the absence of a "sue and be sued" clause in its creating legislation, 
an authority is entitled to a full measure of sovereign immunity.206 
However, most creating legislation enables authorities to sue and be 
sued, 267 and an issue of sovereign immunity arises in determining 
whether this provision allows only contract actions or tort claims as 
we11.2os 
In one line of cases, which emphasize that special governments 
are part of the governmental structure, the courts appear reluctant to 
depart from older holdings that "sue and be sued" clauses for execu-
tive agencies and departments permit suits for breaches of contract 
but not for torts, unless the clause is accompanied by an explicit 
waiver of tort immunity.269 In Masse v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Com-
mission,210 a personal injury suit, the Commission argued that it was 
immune from suit as an instrumentality of Pennsylvania.271 The 
265. The argument that the appointment of the MT A directors violated the one 
person-one vote doctrine was rejected in Metropolitan Transp. Authority v. County of 
Nassau, 28 N.Y.2d 385, 271 N.E.2d 213, 322 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1971). The court stated that 
there is no constitutional requirement that members be elected rather than appointed, 
apparently having in mind the principle that the one person-one vote doctrine does not 
apply to appointed officials. 28 N.Y.2d at 390, 271 N.E.2d at 214, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 230. 
266. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn., 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Taylor 
v. New Jersey Hwy. Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956). Before the Port of New 
York Authority gave its consent to suit, several cases held that the Authority had 
sovereign immunity. See Howell v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.J. 
1940); Marmor v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1952); 
LeBeau Piping Corp. v. City of New York, 170 Misc. 664, 9 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. 1938); 
Voorhis v. Cornell Contracting Corp., 170 Misc. 644, 10 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938). 
267. See, e.g., text accompanying note 37 supra. 
268. Rarely, as, for example, in the case of the Port of New York Authority, this is-
sue is settled by an express statutory waiver of all kinds of immunity. See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 32:1-157 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7101 (McKinney 1961). See also MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 92, §§ 15, 36 (1972) (Mass. Metropolitan Dist. Comm.); N.Y. Pun. AUTH. I.Aw 
§ 1276 (McKinney 1970) (N.Y. Metropolitan Transp. Authority); OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 
69, § 1703 (1969) (fact that Oklahoma Turnpike Authority is empowered by statute to 
carry liability insurance suggests that tort suits are permitted). 
269. See, e.g., Payne v. State Hwy. Commn., 136 Kan. 561, 16 P.2d 509 (1932); Lohr 
v. Upper Potomac River Commn., 180 Md. 584, 26 A.2d 547 (1942); Bush v. State Hwy. 
Commn., 329 Mo. 843, 46 S.W.2d 854 (1932). 
270. 163 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1958). 
271. The court held that eleventh amendment immunity was a federal question that 
had previously been decided adversely to the Commission. 163 F. Supp. at 511. See also 
S.J. Groves&: Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1967), 
for a carefully reasoned holding that an authority is not entitled to sovereign immunity 
under the eleventh amendment as an alter ego of the state. 
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court felt that the Commission was immune under state law from 
liability for its employees' negligent acts unless othenvise provided 
by statute. Immunity was expressly waived with regard to damage to 
property but not for personal injury, so the suit was dismissed.272 
Another line of cases of equal or greater weight has construed the 
"sue and be sued" clause as an effective waiver of tort, as well as con-
tract, immunity.273 Petty v. Tennessee-1.t.1.issouri Bridge Commis-
sion214 involved a suit under the Jones Act against an agency created 
by Tennessee and Missouri, with the consent of Congress, under the 
interstate compact clause of the Federal Constitution.276 The Supreme 
Court, applying federal law, held that the "sue and be sued" clause 
that Congress had included in the compact made "it clear that the 
States accepting it waived any immunity from suit which they other-
wise might have."276 In Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority,277 
the Authority defended a negligence action on the ground that tort 
272. Accord, Conner v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 91 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.S.C. 
1950) (dictum); Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 S.2d 421 (Fla. 1958); 
Miller v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 193 Kan. 18, 392 P.2d 89 (1964); Hosterman v. 
Kansas Turnpike Authority, 183 Kan. 590, 331 P.2d 323 (1958); Miller v. Board of 
Commrs., 1 S.2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1941); Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 
174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961); Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 
216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950); Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 
II7 S.E.2d 685 (1961). The holding in Masse was opposite that of a slightly earlier case, 
Linger v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn., 158 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1958), which 
construed the "sue and be sued" clause as an effective waiver of all immunity. The 
Masse court said of the Linger decision: "[T]hat case finds no rule of decision in the 
state law and apparently ignores the explicit language of Section 6(k) of The Turnpike 
Extension Acts." 163 F. Supp. at 514. In Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn., 407 
Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962), the state supreme court emphasized the Commission's close 
relations with the state and held that it had the same immunity in trespass actions 
arising from the negligence of its employees as did the state. For other e.,amples of close 
identification of an authority with the state, see Fowler v. California Toll-Bridge Au-
thority, 128 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1942); Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Alabama State Bridge 
Corp., 59 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1932); Easly v. New York State Thruway Authority, 1 
N.Y.2d 374, 135 N.E.2d 572, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1956). 
273. See, e.g., Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817 
(1961); Linger v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn., 158 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1958); 
Morrison v. Smith Bros., Inc., 2ll Cal. 36, 293 P. 53 (1930); Harper v. Vallejo Housing 
Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621, 232 P.2d 262 (1951); Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 
Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P.2d 305 (1958); Knowles v. Housing Authority, 212 Ga. 729, 95 
S.E.2d 659 (1956); Hoffmeyer v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 12 Ohio Op. 2d 436, 166 N.E.2d 
543 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1960). See also Dormitory Authority v. Span Elec. Corp., 
18 N.Y.2d ll4, 218 N,E.2d 693, 271 N.Y .S.2d 641 (1966) (alternative holding) (sovereign 
immunity offers Authority no protection from the effects of an arbitration clause). 
274. 359 U.S. 275 (1959). 
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. On the formation of interstate authorities under 
the interstate compact clause, see Celler, Congress, Compacts and Interstate Authorities, 
26 LAW 8: CONTEMP. PROB. 682 (1961); Engdahl, Interstate Urban Areas and Interstate 
";1greements" and "Compacts": Unclear Possibilities, 58 GEo. L.J. 799 (1970); Leach, 
Interstate Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB, 666 (1961). 
276. 359 U.S. at 280. See also Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 
(1940); Keifer 8: Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939). 
277. 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956). 
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liability had not been expressly waived. The court disagreed, noting 
the "sue and be sued" clause in the Authority Act and remarking 
on the disfavor, especially at the federal level, toward the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity:278 
The hostility towards the doctrine of governmental immunity is also 
evidenced in the states and it seems to us that pertinent statutory 
waivers should fairly receive as liberal construction in the states as 
in the federal sphere. In recent years there has been a noticeable 
tendency of legislative bodies to entrust to independent Authorities 
functions which necessitate relationships comparable to those ordi-
narily existent between private parties. It would seem that in all jus-
tice such Authorities should generally not be afforded the highly 
special immunities of the State acting in its sovereign capacity; that 
much has been recognized by the New Jersey Highway Authority 
Act, particularly in its broad terminology which unrestrictedly per-
mits the Authority to sue and be sued in its own name.279 
The split between courts on the sovereign immunity issue may 
not be as deep as it appears. Most courts would agree that a state or 
municipality is immune from suit, if at all, only when it acts in a 
governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, capacity.280 Logically, a 
subdivision such as an authority should have no greater immunity 
than a general government. Therefore, even when a court construes 
a "sue and be sued" clause to allow sovereign immunity in tort to an 
authority, it should look to the nature of the authority's activities 
before allowing or disallowing suit. A transit authority, for example, 
may be predominantly governmental, and a planetarium authority 
predominantly proprietary. Thus, even where there is no statutory 
waiver, two questions should be answered affirmatively before im-
munity is allowed: (I) Is the authority sufficiently part of the 
sovereign so that sovereign immunity might apply? and (2) If so, 
does it carry out governmental, rather than proprietary, functions? 
Some courts that answer the first question affirmatively fail to go 
on to ask the second.281 If the courts that now allow immunity 
278. 22 N.J. at 469-70, 126 A.2d at 321-22. See also Indiana Towing Co. v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 223 Pa. Super. 171, 
297 A.2d 495 (1972); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). For other discussions of the waning of the doctrine, see David, 
Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1956); Van Alstyne, Gov• 
emmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 
163 (1963); Vanlandingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-examined, 61 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 237 (1966); Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Im-
munity, 1964 DUKE L.J. 888. 
279. 22 N.J. at 470, 126 A.2d at 322. 
280. See C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GoVERm1ENT LAW § 11.07 (1955); 2 F. HARPER & F. 
JAMES, TORTS § 29.6 (1956); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.23 (3d ed. 
1963); w. PROSSER, TORTS § 131, at 977-87 (4th ed. 1971). 
281. See, e.g., Conner v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 91 F. Supp. 262 
(E.D.S.C. 1950); Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 S.2d 421 (Fla. 1958); 
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would follow this two-step analysis, their theory would in some 
cases converge with that of the courts that construe the "sue and be 
sued" clauses to waive immunity, for many of the latter decisions 
emphasize the proprietary nature of a given authority's activities 
and the anomaly that would result if the authority were to be im-
mune where a city would not.282 
The governmental-proprietary distinction for municipal tort 
liability, however, is far from satisfactory,283 and its complexities 
could be avoided if courts were to decide that authorities are not 
entitled to sovereign immunity under any circumstances. Even in the 
absence of a statutory waiver of all immunity,284 authorities should 
be required to assume liability for their tortious acts and thus bear 
the full cost of their operations. Since traditional authorities by defi-
nition rely on revenue bonds for financing, the policy of avoiding a 
tort suit that unduly burdens the ta.xpayers will not be subverted. 
Only the users, who, in theory, should pay the full costs of operation 
through tolls, and the bondholders, who voluntarily assume the risk 
of authority default, would bear the burden. Multicounty authorities, 
which to some extent do depend on tax funds, plan and operate 
enormous revenue producing enterprises in the manner of private 
corporations, and it is similarly appropriate to require them to insure 
themselves against liability. Sovereign immunity is not yet unalter-
ably affixed to special governments by history, legislative will, or an 
irreversible trend of judicial authority. At a time when the justifica-
tions for the doctrine ring rather hollow even in the case of general 
governments, this fading doctrine should not be affixed to authori-
ties. 2s1, 
Miller v. Board of Commrs., 1 S.2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1941); Rice Hope Plantation v. 
South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E,2d 132 (1950). 
282. As the court said in Morrison v. Smith Bros., Inc., 211 Cal. 36, 293 P. 53 (1930): 
It would certainly be an anomalous situation if a municipality engaged in a pro-
prietary function, such as running, operating or constructing water works, would 
be liable for the torts of its agents, but if that same municipality should join with 
other municipalities and organize a municipal utility district it would thereby 
immunize itself from all such liability. Such a rule does not appeal to our sense of 
justice nor to our reason. 
211 Cal. at 45, 293 P. at 62. For other cases that deny immunity while focusing on the 
proprietary function involved, see Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 365 U.S. 817 (1961); Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P.2d 
305 (1958); Knowles v. Housing Authority, 212 Ga. 659, 95 S.E.2d 708 (1956); Hoffmeyer 
v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 12 Ohio Op. 2d 436, 166 N.E,2d 543 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 
1960). 
283. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 280, at 1622-23; 18 E. MCQUILLIN, 
supra note 280, at § 53.24a; W. PROSSER, supra note 280, at 978-86. 
284. For express waivers, see statutes cited in note 268 supra. 
285. See Note, The Applicability of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public Au-
thorities, 74 HAR.v. L. REv. 714, 724 (1961): "The policies behind sovereign immunity 
would not seem to be significantly infringed by a complete refusal to apply the doctrine 
to independent authorities." 
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D. Reviewability 
Beyond immunity from tort actions, the possibility of court re-
view of the decisions, plans, and activities of authorities remains un-
explored. For example, rate setting by authorities-unlike that by 
public utilities-is not supervised by state or federal commissions, 
yet courts are unlikely to review authority rate setting other than to 
make sure that specified procedures are complied with,286 for the 
breadth of the statutory mandate usually makes it difficult to argue 
that an authority has exceeded or avoided its responsibilities. The 
nature of the proceeding wherein the actions of an authority may be 
challenged, when a challenge is allowed, is quite varied287 and in-
cludes the use of extraordinary writs, such as mandamus,288 and de• 
claratory judgment actions.289 
The sovereign immunity doctrine that authorities may be sued 
only when they consent will frequently be a stumbling block even in 
a nontort action. Thus, one case has held that claims to realty cannot 
be adjudicated against an authority where the legislature has waived 
immunity only with regard to suits based on torts or breaches of con-
tract;290 another has denied an injunction, holding there is no equity 
jurisdiction over an authority without express authorization.291 
It might be argued that state administrative procedure acts waive 
sovereign immunity and thus make certain activities reviewable, but 
the potential for this approach under present acts is small. First, ad-
286. See, e.g., County of Nassau v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 57 Misc. 2d 
1025, 293 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Application of Love, 155 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 
1956) (court can act if rate arbitrary or capricious). Cf. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Au-
thority v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 348 Mass. 538, 549-50, 205 N.E.2d 346, 355 
(1965): "The determinations of the Authority, however, as to how to exercise its powers 
for the declared public purpose, if within the scope of the delegated power and in con-
formity with the express and necessarily implied statutory requirements, are not to be 
set aside by the courts." 
287. See generally 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 602-62 (1965). See also 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. art. 78 (McKinney 1963). 
288. E.g., Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority, 40 Cal. 2d 317, 253 P.2d 659 
(1953); Gould v. Greylock. Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d ll4 (1966); 
State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 159 Ohio St. 581, ll3 N.E.2d 14 (1953). 
289. E.g., Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 
348 Mass. 538, 205 N.E.2d 346 (1965); Behnke v. New Jersey Hwy. Authority, 13 N.J. 
14, 97 A.2d 647 (1953). 
290. Highway Displays, Inc. v. People, 39 Misc. 2d 703, 241 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct, 
1963). 
291. Town of Amherst v. Niagara Frontier Port Authority, 38 Misc. 2d 906, 238 
N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1963). While the Port of New York Authority consents to actions 
at law or equity, its governing statutes expressly exclude injunctive actions against the 
Authority or its officers or employees other than those brought by the Attorneys Gen-
eral of New York or New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-161, 1-165 (1963); N.Y. UNCON-
soL. LAws §§ 7105, 7109 (McKinney 1961). See also Lewis v. Lefkowitz, 32 Misc. 2d 434, 
223 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (mandamus not available to compel Attorney General 
to seek injunction). 
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ministrative procedure acts are usually applicable only to state 
agencies,292 presumably excluding the myriad of county and city 
created authorities.293 Second, even state created authorities may be 
excluded, for state administrative procedure acts usually define agen-
cies as bodies empowered to make rules or to adjudicate cases,294 and 
a court may view an authority as more analogous to a proprietary 
private corporation than to a rule-making or adjudicative entity for 
this purpose. Indeed, given the independence of authorities from the 
state290 and their revenue-producing purpose, as well as the possible 
cost and delay attendant to court review, it is highly doubtful that 
state legislatures intend to waive immunity as to authorities through 
administrative procedure acts. 
And yet, particularly in the case of the larger and more powerful 
authorities, such as the multicounty authorities, many decisions, 
from rate fixing to route planning, do seem to constitute "rules" of 
general .,application296 that seriously affect the rights, duties, and 
benefits of citizens. For these authorities, at least, it would not be 
unreasonable to provide a method of review easier than the cum-
bersome extraordinary writs, so that a person aggrieved by authority 
292. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 287, at 98-107, for a discussion of the various ways 
in which states define "administrative agency." 
293. An authority created by a county or municipality under an enabling statute 
would be at most identified as an "alter ego" of its creator, and municipalities are not 
ordinarily within the contemplation of "agency" in administrative procedures acts. See, 
e.g., Sloven v. Olson, 98 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1959) (city held not to be an agency 
under act that defined agencies as having statewide jurisdiction). But see Housing Au-
thority v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 243 P.2d 515 (1952) (city and city-created 
authority acting under the state housing authorities law is an agency of the state). 
294. See generally 1 F. COOPER, supra note 287, at 99-107. See id. at 109-27 for deci-
sions and statutes defining "rules" and "adjudicatory proceedings." See also Los Angeles 
Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 687 
n.l, 355 P.2d 905, 906 n.l (1960) (court noted that the Authority's creating act declared 
it to be a public corporation rather than a state agency). 
295. The question of whether or not an authority is a "citizen" for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction in federal courts appears to turn on how closely the authority is 
identified with its creating state. The view that the authority is the "alter ego" of the 
state, rather than a separate citizen, is on the wane, and, consequently, authorities are 
increasingly less likely to be immunized by the eleventh amendment from federal di-
versity suits brought by private parties. See S.J. Groves 8: Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turn-
pike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1967). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. West 
Virginia Turnpike Commn., 109 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. W. Va. 1952). But see Weyerhaeuser. 
Co. v. Roads Commn., 187 F. Supp. 766 (D. Md. 1960). 
296. Actions taken by a governmental agency that are not in the nature of an in-
dividualized trial-like adjudication are commonly called "rules." See 1 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE I.Aw TREATISE§ 5.01 (1958). The rules issued by an agency are commonly 
grouped into "interpretative" rules, e.g., definitions of words in the statute creating the 
agency, and "legislative" rules, e.g., regulations issued under the express authority of the 
statute. Courts are likely to give more deference to the agency's adoption of legislative 
rules and will only examine such actions to see if they are authorized and constitutional. 
In the case of interpretative rules, the courts often substitute their interpretation of a 
statute for that of the agency. Id. at §§ 5.03-.04. 
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action could get a determination on whether the authority was 
acting ultra vires or in violation of required procedures.297 
V. CLAIMED ADVANTAGES OF AUTHORITIES 
From the birth of the Port of New York through the postwar 
boom in authorities, this form of government has had both severe 
critics298 and vigorous defenders.299 However, the more recent appear-
ance of larger, multicounty authorities has not yet generated a great 
deal of debate. The arguments advanced for and against traditional 
authorities may not always be equally relevant to the newer de-
velopments. For example, the multicounty authority may be less 
vulnerable to such charges as that it serves no function other than 
facilitating the issuance of bonds, which a city could issue on its 
own, 300 perhaps at a lower cost. 301 On the other hand, the multicounty 
authority, by virtue of its size and importance, may exacerbate cer-
tain problems, such as lack of local control, which are said to afflict 
the ordinary authority. 
Whether authorities are created because other governmental 
bodies are unable to solve a particular problem, because other bodies 
are anxious to avoid the problem, or for another reason, 302 their use 
is usually justified on three grounds: (1) they have financial advan-
tages, in that they are separate bodies for purposes of state debt limi-
tations; (2) they are more efficient because, among other reasons, 
they attract superior personnel, "de-politicize" an undertaking, and 
must be run in a businesslike manner in order to keep their bond 
ratings; and (3) they have a jurisdictional flexibility, so their boun-
daries may be made coterminous with the range of a needed service. 
A. Financial Advantages 
As has been pointed out above,303 one of the major reasons for the 
rapidly spreading use of authorities has been the desire to escape 
297. In at least one case, Guaranty Trust Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Commn., 109 
F. Supp. 286 (S.D. W. Va. 1952), a federal district court showed some willingness to re• 
view a particular decision made by a public authority in a declaratory judgment action. 
298. See, e.g., McLean, Use and Abuse of Authorities, 42 NATL. MuN. R.Ev. 438 (1953); 
Morris, supra note 65; Porter, A Plague of Special Districts, 22 NATL. MuN. R.Ev. 544 
(1933); Quirk&: Wein, supra note 3. 
299. See, e.g., Edelstein, supra note 9; Gerwig, supra note 9; Nehemkis, supra note 9. 
300. Cities are, in most states, authorized to issue revenue bonds. See note 179 supra. 
301. If the city has not reached the limit imposed upon its debt, it may issue general 
obligation bonds, which may have lower interest rates than revenue bonds. Cf. note 314 
infra and accompanying text. 
302. Compare Dearing, supra note 34, at 741, and Note, Special Districts and Deft• 
cient Local Government in the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, 7 UTAH L. R.Ev. 209 (1960), 
with McLean, supra note 298, at 443, and Makielski, supra note 65, at ll99. 
303. See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra. 
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state-imposed debt restrictions.804 However, the impact of debt limita-
tions is decreasing because increases in property values and assess-
ments have given local governments more debt to work with.305 
Moreover, where the "special fund" doctrine is accepted, traditional 
authorities have no financial advantages, since municipalities can 
finance special projects through their own revenue bonds without 
adding to the debt figure.306 Nevertheless, avoidance of debt limita-
tions seems to have been a factor in the formation of authorities, for 
there is a positive correlation bet1veen restrictive debt provisions and 
the number of special governments.307 
The criticism that the use of authorities subverts the public policy 
embodied in the debt limitations is not persuasive. Debt limitations, 
for the most part, originated in financial abuses of the distant past.308 
Neither private debt nor governmental debt (as symbolized by federal 
deficit spending) attracts the public suspicion and disapproval that 
it once did, and authority defaults have never been a major prob-
lem.300 Moreover, because present-day governments engage exten-
sively in activities once thought appropriate only for proprietary en-
terprises, the modern demand for capital projects could not have been 
foreseen at the time most debt limitations were enacted. Over the 
years, as state legislatures, the courts, and often the electorate have 
sanctioned the authority device, authority debt has grown enor-
mously.310 Clearly, the public policy in favor of providing services has 
proved more compelling than that of limiting state and local debt. 
Most commentators conclude that debt limitations are ineffective 
and unnecessary, and ought to be revised or abolished.311 It could be 
argued that the constraints on local financing should be attacked 
directly by changing or eliminating debt limitations, rather than cir-
cumvented by the creation of authorities. However, new projects are 
304. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. See also Gerwig, supra note 9, at 596-
98, 612-13; COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 21-28, 103. 
305. U.S. ADVISORY Co~!N. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 54. 
306. See text accompanying notes 176-79 supra. 
307. States with constitutional debt limitations have an average of 336 special govern-
ments per state, while those states without such limitations average 245 special govern-
ments. Moreover, in states that limit municipal debt, on the average, 38.63 per cent 
of the total municipal debt is unsecured, while in nonlimit states only 26.32 per cent of 
the debt is unsecured. L. GOODALL, supra note 65, at 44-45, 54-55. See also U.S. ADVISORY 
COMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 32. 
308. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra. 
309. As of 1967, there had been only thirty known defaults since World War II by 
the thousands of special governments that periodically issue bonds. Of the thirty de-
faulted issues, nineteen were of nonguaranteed bonds. W. MITCHELL, THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF DEBT LIMITS ON STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING 29-30 (1967). 
310. See Gerwig, supra note 9, at 598. 
311. See, e.g., L. GooDALL, supra note 65, at 33-34; W. MITCHELL, supra note 309, at 
16-17; U.S. ADVISORY CoMMN, ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 70, at 6; 
Bowman, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L. REv. 863 (1967). 
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constantly in demand, and it may be time-consuming and politically 
difficult to obtain a constitutional or statutory amendment, especially 
one that would on its face increase the ability of governments to con-
tract debt. 812 
However, the method of financing used by traditional authorities 
cannot be embraced without reservation. First, it injects a considera-
tion for the wishes of absentee bondholders into the management of 
a project supposedly operating in the public interest.313 Second, it 
could be argued that revenue bond financing lacks :flexibility in that 
it must guarantee that a specific project will continue to exist and 
collect revenues for, say, thirty years. Most importantly, a higher in-
terest cost appears to be attached to revenue bonds than to general 
obligation bonds, presumably because of the greater risk perceived 
by investors.314 
Multicounty authorities seem able to maximize the advantages 
and to minimize the potential drawbacks of traditional authority fi-
nancing. Like other authorities, they provide a means to avoid debt 
limitations on the cities, counties, or state involved, although they 
may be subject to debt limitations of their own. When an authority 
embraces several cities or counties, it seems logical that if the new 
entity has any debt limitation of its own, it would be equal to the 
combined limits of the counties under its jurisdiction unless the 
enabling statute declares otherwise.311• 
312. Morris, supra note 65, at 265-68, suggests that courts might have declared build-
ing authorities unconstitutional in order to force legislatures to re-examine debt limita-
tions, but he notes that the Maine and Georgia experience when such a stand was 
taken indicates that judicial firmness might be futile. 
313. See PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 23-28. 
314. The Council of State Governments tentatively concluded that the cost of 
borrowing by authorities is greater than the cost of borrowing by a parent state and 
greater than the average cost of borrowing found in the Bond Buyer's Index. COUNCIL 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 70-74. See W. MITCHELL, supra note 309, at 28-31, citing studies 
that estimate that the interest rate differential ranges from .25 per cent to a full 1.25 per 
cent for longer maturities. This difference is significant; a .5 per cent difference in the 
interest rate (e.g., from 3.0 to 3.5 per cent) will raise the aggregate interest cost by 19 
per cent on a thirty-year serial bond. See also J. MAxwELL, FINANCING STATE AND LoCAL 
GoVERNMENTS 204 (1965). A defender of the authority device can, of course, reply that 
the alternative of general obligation bonds is not available because of debt limitations, 
and that the nonfinancial advantages of authorities more than compensate for the extra 
interest cost. Cities in most states can issue their own revenue bonds without using the 
authority device and still avoid debt limitations by invoking the "special fund" doc-
trine. See text accompanying notes 176-79 supra. However, these city revenue bonds 
would probably appear to investors to be just as risky in relation to general obligation 
bonds as are authority bonds. Thus, the interest rate differential would still exist, unless 
it should appear highly probable that the city would be willing and able to step in 
should the lack of project revenue threaten to cause default. Nevertheless, interest costs, 
and consequently the rates charged for use of the facilities so financed, may be higher 
than they would be if debt limitations were removed, allowing general obligations to 
predominate. 
315. Since debt limitations are usually expressed in terms of a percentage of assessed 
value, see text accompanying note 71 supra, the debt limitation of a multicounty author-
ity could be based on the total of the assessed values of the separate counties. 
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The financing method of most multicounty authorities-by vari-
ous combinations of revenue bonds, local property taxes, and state 
funds-gives them another advantage in that they can undertake proj-
ects of great magnitude that could not be financed any other way 
(outside of federal involvement).816 
Nor do multicounty authorities raise the problems connected with 
the financing of authorities to such a great degree. A state or munici-
pal stake in the financing of an authority dilutes bondholder influ-
ence in its operation and minimizes any chance of bondholder con-
trol following default. Also, although the continued reliance, at least 
in part, on revenue-bond financing does irrevocably commit the gen-
eral government to the project, undertakings by multicounty authori-
ties commonly involve facilities that are intended for long-term use, 
so the loss of flexibility is not damaging. Finally, the charge that rev-
enue bonds result in higher interest costs may not be appropriate 
when applied to the typical multicounty authority. The massive 
commitment of state and local resources to such projects as metro-
politan transportation systems suggests that they will not be allowed 
to fail, and an investor might well believe that the revenue bonds 
offered to finance them are not significantly more risky than general 
obligation bonds. 
B. Efficiency 
Another reason for the use of the authority device is the desire 
to promote efficiency in providing services. The origin of the belief 
that authorities can more efficiently manage new revenue-producing 
projects lies in the history of government activities. Many such proj-
ects, such as mass transportation, port facilities, and even toll bridges, 
tunnels, and ferries, were once thought too proprietary to be under-
taken by a government. As local governments moved into these areas 
they adopted the corporate form, which they felt to be more appro-
priate to such business-like activities.817 Local governments wanted 
their service enterprises to be efficiently run and "profit-making" 
(i.e., able to pay off the borrowed funds plus interest over and above 
the costs of operation, maintenance, and, sometimes, expansion), yet 
they had no desire or capability to supervise the operational details 
closely. 818 
It has been suggested that a meaningful comparison of the effi-
ciency of authorities with that of general governments is impossible 
because such a comparison pits different kinds of bodies with differ-
ent purposes and methodologies against each other.819 It may indeed 
316. See Gerwig, supra note 9, at 613, 615. 
317. See COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 21-23. 
318. Id. at 22. 
319. PUBLIC AUTHORITIFS, supra note 3, at 91-92. 
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be impossible to compare the efficiency of these bodies generally. 
However, arguments about their relative efficiency in handling a 
particular project can be adduced from the very differences in their 
purposes and organization. First, the typical authority, unlike a gen-
eral government, usually has only one responsibility, so authority 
directors can concentrate on the one project and develop an exper-
tise, which may be important if a complicated service such as mass 
transit is involved. Also, those in charge of a single-purpose enterprise 
need not worry about making the delicate balance among competing 
needs and constituencies that is required of general governments. 
Second, authorities may be free of certain constitutional or state law 
requirements that restrict general governments, 320 such as civil ser-
vice laws321 and laws governing state agencies in such respects as wage 
rates,322 contract specifications,323 and the acceptance of low bids.324 
Third, and more generally, authorities seem to have greater flexibil-
ity in their methods of operation. For example, when they negotiate 
leases, guarantees, and loans with private businesses they run less risk 
than a general government of being charged with acting beyond their 
proper sphere or of diverting public funds to private purposes.321; 
It also seems likely that policy decisions are more quickly made and 
more easily altered in authorities than in local governments. The 
board of directors is not subject to the procedures, political maneu-
vering, and bureaucratic delays that may act as a drag upon general 
government decision-making. The advantages that come with corpo-
rate form would seem to carry over fully into multicounty authorities. 
It is sometimes suggested that authorities are particularly efficient 
because they must be run in a "business-like" manner in order to 
maintain their bond ratings and attract investors.326 Perhaps the 
shadowy presence of bondholders does promote efficiency in author-
ity operation. Because an authority usually has the responsibility for 
320. It is interesting to note that cases so holding, see text accompanying notes 321-
24 infra, excuse authorities from the operation of certain state laws on the ground that 
authorities are too independent to be agencies or branches of the state. But see Port 
of New York Authority v. J.E. Linde Paper Co., 205 Misc. 110, 127 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. 
City Mun. Ct. 1953), excusing the Authority from emergency rent control laws on the 
ground that as an arm of the state it was exempt from general legislation unless specif-
ically included. 
321. See, e.g., New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 
457, 292 A.2d 580 (1971). 
322. Agesen v. Catherwood, 32 App. Div. 2d 416, 303 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1969). 
323. Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contractors Assn. v. New York 
State Thruway Authority, 5 N.Y.2d 420, 158 N.E.2d 238, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959). 
324. Thompson Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Authority, 48 Misc. 2d 296, 264 N.Y.S.2d 
842 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
325. See Ptrauc AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 92-93, 195-96. 
326. See COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 51; PUBUC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, 
at 90-92, 195-96. Note that this view is a counterweight to the argument that the influ-
ence of absentee bondholders is an undesirable feature of authorities. 
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only one service, its financial situation is far more exposed than it 
would be if the service were merely one of many items on a general 
government's annual budget. And the major investors in state and 
municipal bonds are financial institutions327 capable of detailed and 
sophisticated analysis. Thus, authority directors may well work out 
costs, rates, and future plans with an eye cast toward the bondholders. 
Whatever effect a concern for bond ratings has on efficiency, it is prob-
ably enhanced in the multicounty authority because the very size of 
its projects encourages careful scrutiny by investors. 
The fact that the presence of bondholders may encourage effi-
ciency does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that authorities are 
more efficient than general governments. Whatever the influence 
of bondholders--and it is probably easy to overvalue-authorities 
are not subject to the direct outside control that shareholders poten-
tially exercise over corporations and the electorate exercises over 
cities. All local governments have credit ratings and public con-
fidence to worry about, and it is hard to see why they should be any 
less motivated than authorities to conduct their affairs efficiently. 
The influence of bondholders is merely another incentive to act effi-
ciently and is not as telling as the organizational and operational 
differences between authorities and general governments. 
It may also be suggested that authorities are more efficient than 
general governments because they permit capital facilities to be 
constructed and managed in the public interest by an organization 
that maintains the low profile of a private business--in short, an au-
thority can depoliticize the provision of a service. It is difficult to 
evaluate this contention because the virtues of being "out of politics" 
are conjectural and not susceptible of easy proof. Perhaps an unex-
pressed assumption that accompanies this view is that the decisions 
made in operating authority facilities are basically economic, "busi-
ness" decisions. It would follow that, while it is in the public interest 
to have the facilities available, once they do exist it is not the public 
interest but ordinary business considerations that should guide their 
operation. This assumption may merely reflect a popular view that 
private businesses are better managed than government bodies. Thus, 
"depoliticized" would simply mean that a "business-like" decision-
making process is used instead of a governmental one, which is just 
another way of stating the organizational advantages discussed above. 
Another meaning that "out of politics" may carry is that authori-
ties are relatively immune from partisan considerations. In this sense 
authorities are depoliticized in that neither their personnel nor their 
327. In 1967, banks, insurance companies, other corporations, and miscellaneous in-
vestors held 68.3 billion dollars (par value) of state and municipal bonds, as compared 
to the 39.8 billion dollars held by individuals, partnerships, and personal trading ac-
counts. l\lOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, INC., MUNICIPAL AND GoVERNMENT MANUAL al6 (1968). 
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policies are usually subject to voter approval. This suggests an 
analogy to the insulation afforded appointed judges so that the objec-
tivity of their decision-making will not be undermined by the pros-
pect of upcoming elections. Perhaps directors of authorities can simi-
larly make decisions without having to play to the sympathies of 
various blocs of voters or to worry that their political opponents will 
be presented with a campaign issue. Moreover, the fact that there 
are no periodically elected directors, who may feel obligated to 
make changes because they openly criticized their predecessors, 
promotes continuity in long-range planning. 
Finally, if authorities are sufficiently depoliticized, they may at-
tract more competent personnel than do other governmental institu-
tions. 328 Studies of public authority boards show a high preponder-
ance of business and professional people serving as directors. 320 The 
multicounty authority can be expected to do an even better job in 
attracting superior personnel, for the job to be done is both chal-
lenging and vital to the community, and, while a director's position 
will not require the unpleasantness of an election, it may command 
a considerable amount of prestige and power.330 In some instances a 
substantial salary is also offered.331 It might be feared that authorities 
will drain competent manpower from other local governments, but 
it should be kept in mind that authorities probably attract many 
people who would not otherwise enter politics.832 
It may be true that depoliticization promotes efficient operations, 
but it is not clear that all authorities are truly depoliticized. The 
size and function of the authority is again relevant: An industrial 
exhibit, planetarium, or parking authority may indeed be out of the 
political limelight; the Port of New York Authority clearly is not. 
Such multicounty authorities are frequently subject to the vicissi-
tudes of politics.883 In the first place, the creating statute may pre-
328. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 13, 57-64. 
329. See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
330. PUBLIC AurnoRITIEs, supra note 3, at 66-68. For example, Robert Moses bas been 
one of the most important and controversial figures in public service in New York for 
many years. Much of bis reputation was generated by bis chairmanship of such authori• 
ties as the New York State Power Authority, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Author• 
ity, and the Jones Beach State Parkway Authority. See J. Dore, supra note 111, at 37-41; 
PUBLIC AUTHolUTlllS, supra, at 145-46. Austin Tobin, long-time director of the Port of 
New York Authority, achieved a similar reputation. See J. DoIG, supra, at 33-35; URBAN 
AREAs, supra note 3, at 330-33. 
331. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 67-68. For example, in 1964, Tobin's salary 
as Director of the Port of New York Authority was 60,000 dollars, higher than that of 
the Mayor of New York City or the Governor of New York. The bead of the New Jersey 
Turnpike Authority received 29,500 dollars. Id. at 107. 
332. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 64-68. 
333. See PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 140-44. The choice among the plans 
submitted for the New York MTA, discussed in the text accompanying notes 111-15 
supra, was not entirely free from partisan concerns. On the political background against 
which the MTA was created, see J. DoIG, supra note 111. See also S. MERM1N, JURISPRU• 
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scribe various political checks and balances on authority action, such 
as New York City's veto powers over certain transit operations of the 
MTA334 and the powers of the advisory board of the MBTA over fare 
changes and other important decisions.335 In the second place, it is 
impossible to keep multicounty authorities out of the public eye 
given the impact that their decisions as to fares and routes have on 
metropolitan life.336 Nor can they stay entirely clear of interest 
groups, such as labor unions, merchants' associations, and, in recent 
years, environmental organizations. Increasingly, the question be-
comes not whether authorities are involved in politics, but rather 
how do they, and how should they, fit into the political decision-
making process.337 
There is another sense in which it might be said that authorities 
increase efficiency. It could be argued that the use of revenue-depen-
dent authorities results in a better allocation of resources than does 
providing the same services through taxation, for those who benefit 
directly from the facilities, rather than the general body of taxpayers, 
pay for them. The economics of user charges338 are beyond the scope 
of this article, but, according to traditional economic models, if an 
authority's unsubsidized rates reflect the full cost of a given project, 
a use pattern will tend to develop that accurately reflects the demand 
for, and relative value of, the service. Projects supported by tax funds, 
on the other hand, shift the cost to the entire public; artificially low 
rates, or no rates at all, may be charged, resulting in a greater demand 
than the relative value of the service would ordinarily dictate. This 
is theoretically an inefficient allocation of resources, although it may 
be justified by public policy considerations.339 
Even disregarding the serious objection that many authority func-
tions are vital enough to warrant tax financing in order to insure a 
certain minimum level of services,340 this argument is not completely 
DENCE AND STATECRAFr 3-31 (1963), on the part played by politics in the creation of the 
Wisconsin Development Authority. 
334. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
335. See text accompanying notes 130-32 supra. 
336. Of course, the statutory checks on authorities often operate in just those situa-
tions most likely to arouse public concern. 
337. See generally text accompanying notes 398-401 infra. 
338. See generally NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CoNFERENCE BOARD, USE OF SERVICE CHARGES 
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1965); TAX FOUNDATION, GOVERNMENT FINANCES BRIEF No, 20, 
SPECIAL AssESSMENT AND SERVICE CHARGES IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE (1970). 
339. Insofar as this argument is concerned, if a local government issues its own rev-
enue bonds rather than financing a project through taxation, it would be as efficient as 
an authority in regard to allocation of resources. 
340. It has been pointed out in connection with authorities that the choice between 
financing on a benefit-received principle or financing through taxes because of a de-
sired minimum level of services for the entire community is a basic question of public 
policy that should be decided by traditional political methods. Shestack, supra note 19, 
at 5G8-69. 
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convincing, for the charges levied by authorities may not always re-
flect the actual costs of particular facilities. For example, an authority 
may pool its revenues and equate total revenues and total costs, so 
that profitable facilities help finance deficit ones.341 Also, reflection 
of the full cost is undercut by tax exemptions,342 government grants, 
and the use of government facilities. Finally, the monopoly power 
possessed by some authorities may negate a meaningful expression of 
demand.343 The resource allocation argument is weakest in the case of 
multicounty authorities because they are most likely to pool rev-
enues, receive substantial government grants, facilities, and tax 
revenues, and have a monopoly. 
Multicounty authorities, however, benefit from another important 
source of efficiency that may not be shared by other local govern-
ments. Because they are responsible for a single function on an area-
wide basis, multicounty authorities can achieve economies of scale. 
For instance, they may be able to obtain financing at lower costs and 
to purchase materials in large quantities for lower prices.344 Also, 
the use of the latest technology-for example, the use of computers 
to monitor transportation-is more likely to be economically war-
ranted on a multicounty basis than in an individual county or town. 
Multicounty authorities can also avoid duplication of facilities 
and personnel. A single board of directors can be substituted for the 
multitude of boards required if each city or county is to provide the 
service on its own. Water supply or sewer authorities can integrate 
pipeline systems and efficiently link them with reservoir and treat-
ment facilities. Transportation authorities can design rail and bus 
lines to complement each other and can eliminate underutilized sta-
tions, depots, and tracks in order to locate new ones where service is 
most needed.345 The economies of scale and the avoidance of dupli-
cation of facilities and personnel, together with the advantages of 
corporate organization, singleness of function, and depoliticized 
operation, do indicate on balance that authorities, and particularly 
341. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 105-06. 
342. See text accompanying notes 50-62 supra. 
343. Authorities may be granted monopolies by statute for certain kinds of services, 
such as specific modes of transportation, or they may have natural monopolies in the 
case of projects such as dams, bridges, tunnels, and some public buildings. Even for 
operations, such as dormitories or parking facilities, that could be subject to competi-
tion, authorities have some advantages, as, for instance, tax exemption. 
344. One source reports, for example, that per-capita investment for a sewerage plant 
to serve 500,000 people is only 75 per cent that of a facility for 50,000, and that it costs 
fifty-eight dollars per million gallons to treat sewage with a I million-gallon capacity 
plant, but only twenty-three dollars with a 10 million-gallon plant and eight dollars 
with a 100 million-gallon plant. METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 43. 
345. One of the main reasons that the Port of New York Authority was created was 
to unify and consolidate competing enterprises, particularly the railroads, which each 
desired terminal facilities in strategic harbor areas. See E. BARD, supra note 74, at 37-39; 
F. BIRD, supra note 74, at 10-13. 
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multicounty authorities, can furnish services more efficiently than a 
general government can. 
C. Jurisdictional Advantages 
A persuasive argument in favor of authorities arises from their 
jurisdictional adaptability.846 An authority can be created to plan 
and administer a single bridge, tunnel, or dam that is already wholly 
contained within a city or county. Or, if a turnpike is needed across 
the one hundred miles from one city to another, an authority can be 
responsible for that thin strip spanning several counties. 
This jurisdictional flexibility has its greatest impact in metro-
politan areas, which are typically composed of a large central city 
surrounded by a group of smaller, governmentally independent 
suburbs spread across several counties. Some degree of interde-
pendence among these communities is inevitable: They share 
natural resources, such as water supplies and recreation areas, and 
they share man-made facilities, such as highways, airports, and utility 
systems.847 There is a constant interchange of people who work, shop, 
and seek entertainment outside their own communities. Therefore, 
the policies of a city often have serious consequences-known as 
"spillover effects"848-for its neighbors. The failure to control air 
pollution in central city factories, for example, affects the air of the 
surrounding suburbs; the failure to treat sewage adequately in up-
river communities burdens the downriver central city. 
Paradoxically, one of the most persistent problems with special 
governments has been a product of their marked success: Their use 
has resulted in a bewildering maze of too many governments.849 
Within the 227 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), 
there are 8,636 counties, municipalities, and townships and another 
7,049 authorities and special districts, or about sixty-nine local gov-
ernments per SMSA.850 Rather than creating new jurisdictions coter-
minus with particular needs or uniting municipalities and counties 
in joint projects, the creators of special governments have tended to 
346. This same argument, of course, is advanced for special districts, with the differ-
ence that in that case a taxing unit is created coterminous with the service to be pro-
vided. Thus, a soil conservation district can include the whole of a natural watershed 
lying in several counties, and only residents within the district are taxed. 
347. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 5-7. 
!HS. See, e.g., Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality, 
58 GEO. L.J. 675, 677 (1970); METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 6. 
349. See, e.g., PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 167-75; R. Woon, 1400 GOVERN-
MENTS (1961); McLean, supra note 298, at 438, 441; Nehemkis, supra note 9, at 30-31; 
Porter, supra note 298. 
350. In 1967, 29 SMSAs counted 200 or more local governments within their bound-
aries, and the Chicago area contained 1,113. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 
IO, at 12. 
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give them the same boundaries as existing cities or counties.851 Fur-
thermore, the majority of special governments appear to have been 
created on an ad hoc basis with little attention paid to consolidation 
with, or elimination of, existing special govemments.352 
The consequent fractionalization of government has two detri-
mental effects. First, when activities are committed to the control of 
small, single-purpose bodies and are not coordinated into an over-all 
plan, problems of cooperation, competition, definition of respective 
powers, or merely the establishment of relationships among the local 
governments are inevitable. Second, citizen involvement in local gov-
ernment is discouraged. Not only are citizens likely to be confused 
about the jurisdiction and powers of special governments and unable 
to keep informed about their operation, 353 but also there may seem 
to be no one person or body to hold accountable for the over-all drift 
of local development. 
This proliferation may be to some degree unnecessary. In the 
first place, it might be better if some projects given to special govern-
ments-such as industrial exhibits, planetariums, mineral springs, 
commercial office buildings, and luxury housing-were left in private 
hands. In the second place, it is far from clear that special govern-
ments are always the best way of managing even those activities suited 
for governmental control. Cemeteries, libraries, and parks take no 
special technical expertise to manage and may appropriately be left 
to general governments.354 Corporate decision-making and insulation 
from politics are unlikely to be important in the routine management 
of such activities as war memorials and parking lots.855 
351. See PuBUC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 151. See also Porter, supra note 298, 
at 546. 
352. It is usually necessary to wade through an immense variety of statute headings 
to find the scattered laws on particular authorities. Gerwig, supra note 9, at 592. See also 
New York Post Co. v. Moses, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 207, 176 N.E.2d 709, 713, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7, 
12 (1961) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting): "The legislation applicable to the various Authori-
ties is mostly ad hoc, a 'wilderness of special instances,' so policy considerations to some 
extent control us in deciding whether particular statutes which do not mention Author• 
ities do or do not apply to them." 
353. Despite the fact that the large, important authorities are headed by appointed 
officials, many special governments do have at least some elected officials. In 1967, 8,609 
special governments did not have any elected officials, while 12,655 had an average of 4.3 
elected members each. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS 
OF GOVERNMENTS VOL. 6, No. 1: POPULARLY Eu:cTEo OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LoCAL GOV· 
ERNMENTS 11 (Table 5), 30 (Table 12). 
354. Once the capital facilities are built-and general governments routinely contract 
for such projects on an individual basis-the mere collection of revenues and the dis-
charge of revenue bonds, which keep some single-facility authorities in business, can be 
done by general governments. 
355. It has already been noted that, because of the "special fund" doctrine, constitu-
tional debt limitations are no bar to general governments that wish to issue their own 
revenue bonds and keep the facilities under their own control. See text accompanying 
notes 176-79 supra. However, in the larger cities, where new construction and planning 
of these facilities are constantly going on, a separate governing body may be justified. 
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Before creating an authority, the legislature should consider 
whether it is legitimately needed for increased efficiency or jurisdic-
tional flexibility, as well as for its financial advantages. 
VI. MuLTICOUNTY AUTHORITIES AND ALTERNATIVE 
.AREAWIDE GOVERNMENTS 
The use of the authority device is but one of many plans that have 
been offered to improve various aspects of metropolitan govern-
ment;356 like the others, it has unique strengths and weaknesses. As 
suggested above, the strengths of multicounty authorities lie in in-
creased efficiency and flexibility of jurisdiction. Among the services 
that are best suited for administration by this kind of body are those 
that require accumulated expertise and technological sophistication 
in their management. Continuity of management, attraction of su-
perior personnel, and corporate powers and decision-making will be 
most beneficial in such areas as transportation, water supply and sew-
erage, port direction, and pollution control. Services in which area-
wide administration and planning would result in significant econ-
omies of scale and integration of separate facilities are also likely to 
benefit from administration by multicounty authorities.357 An area-
wide policy is mandatory, for instance, if a transportation plan is ef-
fectively to coordinate bus, train, and subway services with auto travel 
on the roads, ferries, and bridges, and through tunnels. 
Yet, while the use of a multicounty authority aids rational plan-
ning in the distribution of a single service, it might be argued that 
general governments are better suited to areawide administration. 
Not only can they, too, achieve economies of scale, but they alone have 
an overview of all the service needs of an area and are directly re-
sponsible to the voters. However, the current proliferation of govern-
ments within metropolitan areas has made areawide administration 
by general governments almost impossible. The planners in each city 
and county are not only limited to their own jurisdictions, but also 
run into a variety of autonomous single-purpose governments within 
their own boundaries. 
Because of these problems, many suggestions have been made for 
356. See text accompanying notes 358-67 infra. 
357. Needs that are merely common to all parts of a metropolitan area must be dis-
tinguished from those that are more effectively administered on an areawide basis. It 
may well be, for instance, that a dearth of parking lots is a problem throughout a 
metropolis; it is far from certain, however, that areawide administration of parking lots 
is necessary to solve the problem. Individual cities may or may not remedy such prob-
lems without risk of serious spillover effects. Sewage disposal and transportation, on the 
other hand, may be handled inefficiently if each city cares only for its small domain. 
See Banfield &: Grodzins, Some Flaws in the Logic of Metropolitan Reorganization, in 
MErROPOLITAN PoLmcs 142-52 (M. Danielson ed. 1966). As is implied by the title of their 
article, the authors do not believe that the case for areawide government is as strong as 
is often stated. 
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coordination or consolidation of traditional general governments in 
order to allow areawide planning. Cooperation has been promoted 
through intergovernmental agreements358 and the council of govern-
ments approach.359 Such arrangements do have a broad geographical 
base and increase awareness of areawide problems. However, because 
they are voluntary and lack extensive legal powers, they are limited 
in their ability to deal with the difficult and controversial issues of re-
source allocation, the setting of priorities, and the resolution of con-
flicting interests.360 Regional planning authorities or commissions, 
which have merely advisory powers,361 have made contributions in 
projecting future growth and suggesting appropriate governmental 
action, but they too seldom translate advice into action.362 Extensive 
efforts have also been made to merge a group of general govern-
ments into a single unit. But such reforms as city-county consolida-
tion, 363 annexation, 364 federation of local governments, 365 and "urban 
counties"366 have met with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm among the 
electorate. 367 
358. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 41-43, 87-88; Kuyper, Inter-
governmental Cooperation: An Analysis of the Lakewood Plan! 58 GEO. L.J. 777 (1970); 
Merrill, Our Unrealized Resources-Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 
349 (1970). 
359. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 88-90; Camus, The Council of 
Governments Approach to Governmental Fragmentation, 22 VAND. L. REv. 811 (1969); 
Lineberry, _supra note 348, at 680-81. 
360. METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 90. 
361. Only about a quarter of these bodies have mandatory referral power to review 
local plans, and their implementing powers are severely limited. JOINT CENTER FOR 
URBAN STUDIES, THE E!>FEGnVENESS OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING 44 (1964). 
362. See METROPOLirAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 110-12; JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN 
STUDIES, supra note 361, at 39-66. Recently there have been efforts to give regional 
advisory boards mandatory powers over local governments and private parties. See, e.g., 
Assembly Bill No. 220, Cal. Legis., 1972 Regular Sess. (not enacted). 
363. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 102-04; Lineberry, supra note 
348, at 698-701. 
364. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 98-101; Woodroof, Systems and 
Standards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58 GEo. L.J. 743 
(1970). 
365. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 104-06; Lineberry, supra note 
348, at 701-06. 
366. See MErROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 90-93; Lineberry, supra note 348, 
at 683. 
367. A summary of 47 referendums on metropolitan reorganization undertaken in 36 
of the nation's 227 SMSAs shows that 18 efforts were successful (although one in Denver 
created a metropolitan district later declared unconstitutional). This success rate is not 
as impressive as it may appear for three reasons. First, the summary includes only those 
campaigus in which reform forces were strong enough to get the issue on a ballot; look-
ing at the statistics another way, only ten per cent of metropolitan areas have even 
held referendums on reorganization. Second, only four of the 36 areas holding referen-
dums included a city with a 1960 population greater than 500,000. Thus, in the larger 
metropolitan areas, where reform efforts are most urgently needed, few major reforms 
have been undertaken. Third, it has been the modest changes, rather than the far-reach-
ing ones that have had the greatest success. Lineberry, supra note 348; at 715-17. 
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Reasons for political resistance to areawide general government 
will vary from case to case, but they may include (1) voter unaware-
ness of the need for change, (2) mutual distrust between residents of 
suburbs and central cities, (3) fear that urban reorganization means 
higher taxes and loss of neighborhood influence in such matters as 
education and law enforcement, (4) opposition from politicans who 
face the loss of their jobs, and (5) opposition from black voters who 
do not want to dilute their central city political strength.368 Au-
thorities do not face these stumbling blocks, in part because they are 
often simply imposed by state legislatures, in part because each au-
thority deals with only one service and leaves general governments 
intact, and in part because the kinds of services performed by au-
thorities are usually the less politically volatile ones. 
To date, multicounty authorities have permitted areawide plan-
ning for at least some individual services. Whether multicounty au-
thorities will evolve further into areawide general governments is 
uncertain. The intriguing model of Metropolitan Seattle suggests an 
intermediate step, in which one multicounty authority provides a 
number of services areawide, while leaving other governmental func-
tions in the hands of more traditional units. 
The Seattle plan was made possible by a Washington statute 
that allows the residents of a city of 500,000 and at least one other 
city to form a metropolitan municipal corporation to perform one or 
more of six functions: sewage disposal, water supply, public transpor-
tation, garbage disposal, parks and parkways maintenance, and com-
prehensive planning.369 What results is a two-layered government: A 
single multipurpose authority carries out its functions areawide, but 
all other functions are retained by the local governments. Those ser-
vices handled by the multipurpose second layer are financed by rev-
enue bonds and an areawide property tax.370 
368. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 107-10; Lineberry, supra note 
348, at 690-96. See also J. BoLI..ENs & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS 491-524 (1965); G. 
STEINER, l\lETROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT AND THE R£AL WORLD! THE CASE OF CmCAGO 7-12 
(1966); Adrian, Suburbia and the Folklore of Metropology, in METROPOLITAN PoLmcs 
172-79 (M. Danielson ed. 1966); Ylvisaker, Why Mayors Oppose Metropolitan Govern-
ment, in METROPOLITAN PoLmcs 180-88 (M. Danielson ed. 1966); Tobin, The Metro-
politan Special District: lntercounty Metropolitan Government of Tomorrow, 14 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 333, 348-53 (1960). 
369. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 35.58.010-.900 (1965), as amended, WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN. §§ 35.58.020-.930 (Supp. 1972). The voters in the Seattle area approved the creation 
of Metropolitan Seattle in 1958, but it had powers only over sewage disposal until public 
transportation powers were approved by the electorate on Sept. 19, 1972. 
370. This development is in accordance with the 1961 recommendations of the United 
States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that 
states consider the enactment of legislation authorizing local units of government 
within metropolitan areas to establish, in accordance with statutory requirements, 
metropolitan service corporations or authorities for the performance of govern-
mental services necessitating areawide handling, such corporations to have appro-
priate borrowing and taxing power, but with the initial establishment and any 
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The development of two-layered government is not necessarily in-
consistent with the recent movement for decentralization, local con-
trol, and community involvement in government.371 The thrust of 
this movement has been directed toward such traditionally local ser-
vices as law enforcement and education, in which most citizens have 
a strong personal stake, and these services can be left with the "first 
layer" of local general governments. Services that are more techno-
logical and less controversial can appropriately be given to the second 
layer.s12 
VII. Accountability 
The greatest cause for concern about the increasing impact of au-
thorities is the lack of public supervision of their activities.373 How-
ever, although the policies of most authorities are not subject to elec-
toral approval,374 their activities are subject to some legal checks. 
subsequent broadening of functions and responsibilities being subject to voter ap-
proval on the basis of an areawide majority. 
U.S. ADVISORY COMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, 
ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN .AREAs 26 (1961). 
371. See, e.g., Hagman, Regionalized-Decentralism: A Model for Rapprochement in 
Los Angeles, 58 GEo. L.J. 901 (1970). 
372. Some help in deciding which services fall into this group is provided by the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which has rated fifteen urban 
services on a scale of "most local" to "least local." U.S. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PERFORMANCE OF URBAN FUNcrIONS: LOCAL AND .AREAWIDE 
8-23 (1963). The Commission evaluated the services according to seven criteria: (1) the 
government responsible for a particular service should have sufficient jurisdiction to 
minimize spillover effects, (2) it should be large enough to realize economies of scale, 
(3) it should have geographic area adequate for effective performance, (4) it should have 
legal and administrative ability to perform the service, (5) it should be responsible for 
enough functions so that it is able to balance governmental needs and resources, (6) 
it should be accessible to its residents so that its functions remain controllable, and 
(7) it should be able to maximize citizen participation while performing adequately 
Id. at 41-60. 
This list mixes political, economic, and administrative goals that are not necessarily 
consistent with one another. No weight is given the various factors, nor is any method 
of striking a balance provided. The list does point out some important considerations, 
but it should not be considered definitive in a concrete case. See J. BOLLENS 8: H. 
SCHMANDT, supra note 368, at 310-13. 
Traditionally tax-supported services, such as fire and police protection, public edu-
cation, libraries, and public health, are found at the "most local" end of the scale. At 
the "least local" (or "areawide") end of the scale are found pollution control, water 
supply, sewage disposal, transportation, planning, and hospital facilities. The Commis-
sion seems to have worked more from impression than from hard data, for it recognizes 
that its particular ranking would not necessarily apply to any particular metropolitan 
area. U.S. ADVISORY COMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra, at 8. However, its 
"least local" choices do tend to be those that require technologically sophisticated 
management. 
373. See, e.g., CouNCIL REPORT, supra note 9, at 106-10; PuBuc AUTHORITIES, supra 
note 3, at 71-83, 116-22, 125-47; Cameron, Whose Authority?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 
1959, at 38; Gerwig, supra note 179, at 403-07; McLean, supra note 298, at 438-39; 
Shestack, supra note 9, at 568-69. 
374. Most authorities are created without public referendums. See CouNCIL REroRT, 
supra note 9, at 38-39. In addition, the most important authority offices are filled by 
appointment. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
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State legislatures have the final power over authorities in that they 
may dissolve them once their bonds are discharged. Similarly, as an 
ultimate check on mismanagement,jthere are various statutory, and 
possibly common law, remedies for the bondholder constituency 
should an authority default.375 Other provisions to deter misconduct 
include the powers possessed by governors to remove directors for 
cause376 or, more rarely, to veto authority activities.377 Some authori-
ties are empowered or required to hold public hearings before taking 
certain actions,378 and a majority of authorities are required to submit 
annual reports to executive officials or state legislatures.379 The pres-
ence of state or locally elected officials as ex officio members of an 
authority's governing body380 may also keep authority policies in 
harmony with those of general governments.881 There have been 
scattered attempts to provide for supervision of authorities by other 
government units through such means as the Advisory Board of the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.382 Such an arrange-
ment is now unique but may well become more common.388 
375. Some statutes enumerate bondholder remedies on default. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. 
Aum. LAW §§ 1207-h, 1273, 1299-m, 1365 (McKinney 1970). See also Nehemkis, supra 
note 9, at 24-26. 
376. See, e.g., MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 124.410 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW 
§ 2527 (McKinney 1970) (general removal power applying to all New York authorities). 
The removal power is, of course, only a weak deterrent for the most deplorable behavior, 
and it has almost never been exercised. Quirk &: Wein, supra not<; 3, at 568 n.284. See 
also Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn., 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956) (in 
absence of statutory authorization, governor could not remove authority officer under a 
general constitutional removal power over "appointed officers'). 
377. The Port of New York Authority has been required since 1927 to submit the 
minutes of each meeting to the governors of both New Jersey and New York, either of 
whom can veto any action taken. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:2-6 to -9 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. 
LAws §§ 7151-54 (McKinney 1961). This power must also be seen only as an ultimate 
reservation of power; it had beei;i used only nine times up to 1969. URBAN .AREAs, supra 
note 3, at 368-72. 
378. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Agency is required to hold a 
public hearing before changing its fares or fees. N.Y. PUB. Aura. LAw § 1266(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1970). County of Nassau v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 57 Misc. 2d 1025, 
293 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1968), characterized the MTA as a semi-legislative body for 
purposes of rate setting and held that the required public hearing was primarily to 
provide information for the hearing body and need not be conducted as a judicial bear-
ing. See also Educational Broadcasting Corp. v. Ronan, 68 Misc. 2d 776, 328 N.Y.S.2d 
107 (Sup. Ct. 1972), holding that the MTA was within its rights in refusing to permit live 
television broadcasts of its public bearings; Glen v. Rockefeller, 61 Misc. 2d 942, 307 
N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct.), affd. mem., 34 App. Div. 2d 930, 313 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1970), holding 
that it was not a denial of due process for the City Transit Authority to raise fares 
without a public bearing when it was not statutorily required to hold such a hearing. 
379. COUNCIL REPoRT, supra note 9, at 57. See also U.S . .ADVISORY COMMN. ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 51-52, on the inadequacy of the re-
porting of authority activities. 
380. See text accompanying note 252 supra. 
381. See COUNCIL R.El'oRT, supra note 9, at 41-43. 
382. See text accompanying notes 130-34 supra. 
!18!!. An analogous development may be seen in California's attempt to deal with the 
problem of the proliferation of special governments by creating in each county a Local 
1434 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1376 
Direct accountability to the public remains a major problem. In 
one sense, this problem arises from the relative anonymity of author-
ities. 384 An authority may only rarely embark upon major new proj-
ects, and its routine duties are seldom considered newsworthy by the 
press.385 Moreover, the information released about those large au-
thorities that are in the public eye frequently comes from within the 
authority itself.386 It may be difficult to require an authority to di-
vulge additional information. In New York Post Corp. v. 1'.1.oses, 387 the 
Post sought an order permitting it to inspect the files and records of 
the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority. The court refused, on 
the grounds that no statutory provision expressly allowed "a tollpayer 
or a citizen to examine the papers of an Authority."388 Stressing the 
Authority's separate existence from the state, the court also rejected 
the argument that the Authority was an agent of the city or a "public 
office" for the purposes of a general public records law.389 Despite 
the desirability of citizen access to information about the conduct of 
government departments, the court held that it was up to the legis-
lature to decide the extent to which an authority's operations should 
be open to public scrutiny.aoo 
Tobin v. United States391 involved the Executive Director of the 
Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO), see CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 54773-99.5 (West 1966), 
as amended, CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 54774-54863 (West Supp. 1973), to encourage the or-
derly development of local government agencies. These commissions have extensive 
powers, including the power to disapprove the creation or modification of special dis-
tricts. See generally Note, LAFCO: ls It in Control of Special Districts?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 
913 (1972). 
384. See U.S. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, 
at 67-68. See also J. BOLLENS, supra note 8, at 1. 
385. It has been suggested that this anonymity opens the contracts and directorships 
of authorities to political patronage. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 142; McLean, 
supra note 298, at 442. The problem of patronage does not seem to have been exten-
sive in practice, at least in part because salaried directorships and large construction 
contracts are normally connected only with the important authorities that receive a fair 
amount of public attention. 
386. The Port of New York Authority, an extreme example, has both a public rela-
tions department with an annual budget of over 328,000 dollars and a community rela-
tions department. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 12, 131-33. 
387. 10 N.Y.2d 199, 176 N.E.2d 709, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1961). 
388. IO N.Y.2d at 203, 176 N.E.2d at 710, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
389. 10 N.Y.2d at 203-04, 176 N.E.2d at 710, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10. 
390. IO N.Y.2d at 205, 176 N.E.2d at 712, 219 N.Y.S.2d at ll. The court was not 
swayed by an argument that this holding would result in a system whereby no repre-
sentative of the public could investigate what happened to the vast sums of money 
spent. The statute creating the Authority provided for investigation by the State and 
City Comptrollers, the State Commission of Investigation, the Mayor of New York City, 
the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and the Chairman of the Assembly 
Ways and Means Committee. IO N.Y.2d at 205, 176 N.E.2d at 71I, 219 N.Y.S.2d at IO. 
Accord, Brown v. Minuse, 41 Misc. 2d 427, 245 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See also 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 141.421-.433 (Supp. 1973) (provisions for reports, auditing, 
and access to confidential information of "local units" of government). 
391. 806 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962). 
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Port of New York Authority, who had been found guilty of contempt 
of Congress by the district court for refusing to produce certain sub-
poenaed documents in connection with an investigation conducted 
by a subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives.892 
Congress had consented to the interstate compact creating the Au-
thority but expressly retained "the right to alter, amend, or repeal" 
its approval398 and was considering such action. The court sidestepped 
the question of whether Congress could constitutionally reserve the 
right to amend or revoke its approval of an interstate compact. Rather, 
the court held that the investigatory power granted to the committee 
by Congress was only intended to cover documents relating to the 
actual activities and operations of the Authority. Therefore, "the ad-
ministrative communications, internal memoranda, and other intra-
Authority documents demanded by the subpoena" were not required 
to be furnished. 304 
Even if access to internal information about an authority is gained, 
the public usually has no means of input into an authority's decision-
making process more direct than the election of state representatives. 
The lack of representation of various minority segments of society on 
authority boards may aggravate the problem of accessibility.395 
However, the impact of an authority's plans and policies on the 
public can be direct indeed. A new bridge may spark a building 
boom in a given neighborhood; a decision on the placement of a thru-
way interchange may cause a great fluctuation in property values;896 
the availability of public transportation may dictate the commuter 
pattern and thus affect air pollution; and the availability of a water 
supply linkage may be crucial to a new real estate subdivision. 
The concern about lack of public control is particularly acute in 
the case of multicounty authorities for three reasons: (1) their size and 
scope magnifies their impact; (2) they rely in part on property taxes 
and/or state funds; and (3) they have a potential for evolving into 
areawide general governments or, at least, multifunctional "second 
layers" of government. Perhaps for these reasons, multicounty au-
thorities have stronger provisions for control than most traditional 
authorities. 897 
392. 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961), noted in 62 CoLUM. L. REY. 532 (1962). 
393. 306 F.2d at 271. 
394. !106 F.2d at 275-76. 
395. In recognition of the problem of representation, the Boston Metropolitan Area 
Planning Council is required to have among its council members "sufficient represen-
tation of minority and low-income groups so as to substantially represent their view-
points in the area to be served by the council." MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, § 24 (Supp. 
1971). 
396. See PtmLIC AUTHORITIES, supra note 3, at 56; Gulick, "Authorities" and How to 
Use Them, 8 TAX REY. 47, 50-51 (1947). 
397. See text accompanying notes 109-10, 115 (MTA), 130-34 (MBTA), 146, 148-52 
(BARTD) supra. 
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Assuming that, as seems probable, the ability of authorities to 
plan for and meet service needs is enhanced not only by their jurisdic-
tional flexibility but also by their corporate form and separation from 
traditional general government, the dilemma is clear: To what extent 
are the advantages of efficiency in providing a service more important 
than the maintenance of citizen involvement in, and ultimate control 
of, its operation? 
The answer to this question is finally a matter of judgment and 
political philosophy. As has already been noted, the one person-one 
vote doctrine does not constitutionally require any particular form of 
control.398 Given that, there are three basic postures that a legislature 
could take. First, it could conclude that the advantages of economy, of 
efficiency, and, perhaps, of obtaining financing that can be achieved 
by separation from direct public control are critically important. 
Many of the smaller authorities have been, and might reasonably con-
tinue to be, kept as autonomous as possible for this reason. However, 
the impact of multicounty authorities is such that absolute autonomy 
for them is undesirable. 
Second, a legislature could conclude that authorities should be 
controlled by the public to the same degree as are local general gov-
ernments. It may be argued that authorities are subverting constitu-
tional debt limitations and that their organizational advantages, if 
any, are outweighed by their inherent lack of public accountability. 
The adherents of this position would tum the functions of author-
ities over to general govemments.399 Alternatively, it may be felt that 
the scope of some authorities so closely approaches the full panoply of 
governmental powers that, while their separateness and form should 
be retained because of their jurisdictional advantages, their directors 
should be elected by the people. The first of these two positions is un-
convincing. Debt limitations are anachronistic,400 and their avoid-
ance is not the only basis on which authorities can be justified. More-
over, not all authorities are important enough to merit full public 
accountability, and the impossibility of adequately controlling the 
others is far from certain. The second argument must be accorded 
more weight, particularly in the case of multicounty authorities, in-
sofar as it suggests the need for public controls; that direct election of 
the board is the most desirable form of control is less clear. 
The third position that a legislature could take, and the one most 
commonly adopted, is a middle course between these two, a balance 
between public accountability and operational independence. Indirect 
control that is sufficient to protect the public interest, yet not so re-
398. See generally text accompanying notes 206-65 supra. 
399. For example, this seems to be the conclusion of Quirk & Wein, supra note 3, 
at 597. 
400. See text accompanying notes !308-09, 311 supra. 
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strictive as to hamper efficiency, can be maintained. At least in the 
case of the more technologically oriented services, it is reasonable to 
sacrifice a certain amount of public control in return for economy 
and efficiency. A great deal of experimentation with different forms 
of state and local control is necessary to find an appropriate bal-
ance, 401 and the variety of arrangements seen in the NYMT A, the 
MBT A, and BAR TD is a healthy sign. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Public authorities effectively fuse governmental powers and im-
munities with corporate organization. While it may be that more 
projects have been turned over to them than is strictly necessary, 
authorities do exist in great numbers and are certain to remain on 
the local scene for the foreseeable future. At the same time, un-
certainties persist as to their legal status, powers, and liabilities. 
'Whether state legislatures create authorities directly or authorize 
cities and counties to do so, they can improve the present situation. 
Careful delineation of the powers, activities, and limitations of each 
authority, old and new, is the minimum that should be asked. A 
compilation under a single heading of all the statutes of a given state 
relating to authorities, as New York has done,402 might facilitate pub-
lic acquisition of information and encourage legislatures to re-ex-
amine their over-all policy toward authorities. Perhaps uniform stat-
utes could be designed for such matters as annual reports, access to 
authority records, and reviewability of decisions under state adminis-
trative procedure acts. 
Much that has been said in regard to traditional authorities is ap-
plicable to multicounty authorities. But multicounty authorities do 
differ in both their structure and their potential. Because of their size 
and the vital functions that they typically perform, they magnify the 
virtues and the vices of the ordinary authority. Moreover, they carry 
within themselves the seeds of metropolitan governmental reorgani-
zation. In a sense, they represent a new strain of the species, and their 
proper function and structure are not yet settled. Much work re-
mains to be done. Sharpening the analysis of the powers and duties 
of multicounty authorities, experimenting with nondisabling re-
straints, and increasing public understanding of the role of these 
bodies are among the most important tasks. On balance, the record of 
authorities in efficient capital construction and operation and the 
jurisdictional potential of multicounty authorities make the effort 
seem worthwhile. 
1 
401. See A. IlROMAGE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN METROPOLITAN AGENCIES 78-99 
(1962), for a discussion of alternatives in appointing or electing authority officials. 
402. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 1-3002 (McKinney 1970). 
